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Armen Avanessian 
The basic thesis of post-contemporary is that 
time is changing. We are not just living in a new 
time or accelerated time, but time itself—the 
direction of time—has changed. We no longer 
have a linear time, in the sense of the past being 
followed by the present and then the future. It’s 
rather the other way around: the future happens 
before the present, time arrives from the future. 
If people have the impression that time is out of 
joint, or that time doesn’t make sense anymore,  
or it isn’t as it used to be, then the reason is, I 
think, that they have—or we all have—problems 
getting used to living in such a speculative time  
or within a speculative temporality.
Suhail Malik 
Yes, and the main reason for the speculative 
reorganization of time is the complexity and 
scale of social organization today. If the leading 
conditions of complex societies are systems, 
infrastructures and networks rather than 
individual human agents, human experience loses 
its primacy, as do the semantics and politics 
based on it. Correspondingly, the present as the 
primary category of human experience—in its 
biological sentience at least—which has been the 
basis for both the understanding of time and of 
what time is (or, at least, what it is presumed to 
be), also loses its priority in favor of what we could 
call a time-complex.¹ One theoretical ramification 
of the deprioritization of the present we can 
mention straightaway, but will need to return to 
later, is that it is no longer necessary to explain 
the movement of the past and the future on the 
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basis of the present. We are instead in a situation 
where human experience is only a part of—or 
even subordinated to—more complex formations 
constructed historically and with a view to what 
can be obtained in the future. The past and the 
future are equally important in the organization of 
the system and this overshadows the present as 
the leading configuration of time. 
Complex societies—which means more-
than-human societies at scales of sociotechnical 
organization that surpass phenomenological 
determination—are those in which the past, the 
present, and the future enter into an economy 
where maybe none of these modes is primary, or 
where the future replaces the present as the lead 
structuring aspect of time. This is not absolutely 
new, of course: for a long time political economy 
and social processes have been practically dealing 
with the subordination of the human to the social 
and technical organization of complex societies. 
Equally, under the heading of Speculative 
Realism, philosophy too has recently been trying 
to reset the notion of speculation as the task of 
finding more-than-human forms of knowledge 
by establishing the conditions within conceptual 
thought of knowledge of what is beyond human 
experience. That project is certainly attached to 
the conditions of the time-complex but is also 
distinct to it—
¹ The time-complex 
is specific to the 
structures of 
integrated socio-
technical and psychic 
mnemic systems 
of individuation 
proposed by Bernard 
Stiegler. See for 
example Technics 
and Time Volume 
2: Disorientation, 
trans. Stephen 
Barker (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford 
University Press, 
2008) and Symbolic 
Misery Volume 1: 
The Hyperindustrial 
Epoch, trans. 
Barnaby Norman 
(Oxford: Polity, 
2104). But the 
speculative time-
complex is distinct 
to Stiegler’s thesis in 
that (i) it comprises 
a speculative 
constitution of 
time rather than 
memory and human 
temporalization, and 
(ii) the speculative 
time-complex 
is here aﬃrmed 
against Stiegler’s 
appeal to rescuing 
an aesthetically-
constituted 
experience of 
individuation despite 
complexifying 
sociotechnical 
configurations.
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AA 
And to some concrete examples of the speculative 
time-complex that we know from everyday 
experience or from daily news. These are 
phenomena that usually start with the prefix “pre-
”, like preemptive strikes, preemptive policing, the 
preemptive personality—
SM 
Could you outline these phenomena?
AA 
What has been called preemptive personality or 
personalization is how you get a certain package 
or information about what you might want that 
you haven’t explicitly asked for from a commercial 
service.² We know a version of this from Amazon: 
its algorithmic 
procedures give us 
recommendations for 
books associated with 
one’s actual choices 
but the preemptive 
personality is one 
step ahead: you get 
a product that you 
actually want. The 
company’s algorithms 
know your desires;  
they know your needs even before you become 
aware of them yourself. It doesn’t make sense  
to say in advance that “I’ll send it back” because  
it is likely that it will be something you will need.  
I don’t think that all this is necessarily bad, but  
we do have to learn how to deal with it in  
a productive or more pro-active manner. 
Another thing, often criticized, is the politics 
of preemptive strikes, which is also  
a new phenomenon of the 21st century. Brian 
Massumi and others have written about the 
kind of recursive truth they produce: you bomb 
somewhere and then afterwards you will find the 
enemy you expected.³ You produce a situation 
that was initially a 
speculation. The logic 
here is recursive and, 
to reiterate, the strike 
is not made in order 
to avoid something, 
a deterrence before 
the enemy strikes. It’s also very diﬀerent to the 
twentieth century logic of the balance of threats  
or prevention. Rather, what happens in the 
present is based on a preemption of the future, 
and of course this is also linked to what has been 
called a tendency towards premediation in  
the media. 
Another everyday example of this new 
speculative temporality discussed a lot nowadays 
² Rob Horning, 
“Preemptive 
personalization,” 
The New Enquiry 
(September 11, 2014), 
accessed on [http://
thenewinquiry.com/
blogs/marginal-
utility/preemptive-
personalization/].
³ Brian Massumi, 
“Potential Politics 
and the Primacy of 
Preemption,” Theory 
& Event 10:2, (2007).
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is preemptive policing. You have it in science 
fiction, notably with the “PreCrime” and precog 
detection of Philip K. Dick’s Minority Report (and 
the Spielberg film based on it). Versions of this 
are adopted more and more in policing today. 
This has to be distinguished from other current 
surveillance strategies; for example, CCTV is more 
of an older idea of watching what people are doing 
or documenting what they have done, to reinforce 
exclusion mechanisms. The question today, if one 
puts it in chronological terms, seems to be more 
along the lines: what kind of policing is needed to 
apprehend people even before they do something, 
with what they will do—as if the future-position 
promises more power, which creates a future-
paranoia? This is less a surveillance directed to 
the exclusion of people than one that deals with 
people inside the social space, with the value 
they produce. How can they be observed and how 
to extract value from their activities? There is of 
course a hugely important biopolitical factor in 
this regulation of the population, especially with 
regards to medicine and insurance. 
SM 
Along with “pre-”, what’s advanced by the time-
complex is also a condition of the “post”, the 
current ubiquity of which characterizes where we 
are at now, and which is maybe added to with the 
contention of the post-contemporary. Everything 
now seems to be “post-” something else, which 
indexes that our understanding of what is 
happening now has some relation to but is also 
disconnected to historically given conditions.… 
While the “pre-” indexes a kind of anticipatory 
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deduction of the future that is acting in the 
present—so that future is already working within 
the now, again indicating how the present isn’t  
the primary category but is understood to  
be organized by the future—what the “post-”  
marks is how what’s happening now is in 
relationship to what has happened but is no 
longer. We are the future of something else.  
The “post-” is also a mark of the deprioritization  
of the present. 
If we are post-contemporary, or post-
postmodern, post-internet, or post-whatever— 
if we are now post-everything—it is because  
historically-given semantics don’t quite work 
anymore. So, in a way, the present itself is a 
speculative relationship to a past that we have 
already exceeded. If the speculative is a name  
for the relationship to the future, the “post-” is  
a way in which we recognize the present itself  
to be speculative in relationship to the past. We 
are in a future that has surpassed the conditions 
and the terms of the past.
Combined, the present is not just the 
realization of the speculative future (the “pre-”) 
but also a future of the past that we are already 
exceeding. As many contributors to this issue 
propose, we don’t quite have the bearings or the 
stability or the conventions that the past oﬀers  
to us (the “post-”).
AA 
That’s the important thing, that the change of 
the present, the shaping of the present is not 
necessarily determined by the past. The present 
can no longer primarily be deduced from the 
past nor is it an act of a pure decisionism, but 
it’s shaped by the future. For me, that’s the key 
problem and the key indication that the logic of the 
contemporary with its fixation on the present—you 
called it the human fixation on experience—that 
this presentism has diﬃculties or even completely 
fails in dealing with the logic of being constituted 
by the future.
I think that’s partly the reason for all 
the critical reasoning and questioning of 
contemporaneity in recent years that happened 
parallel to the so-called speculative turn. 
Unfortunately, speculation is often discussed as 
just a logical or philosophical issue but not in its 
unique time aspect. But obviously we are also still 
looking for the right philosophical or speculative 
concepts for this post-contemporary (or past-
contemporary) condition or time-complex.
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SM 
Yes, as much as we are each indebted in diﬀerent 
ways to speculative realism, and shared the  
move away from the poststructuralist or late- 
twentieth century models of philosophy that we 
both come from, nonetheless speculative realism 
has mostly argued for an intra-philosophical or 
conceptual notion of speculation, which is to think 
of the outside of thought and the experience of 
thought. The interest of the post-contemporary is 
to understand and operationalize the present from 
outside of itself. I don’t know at this point if that is 
also outside of thought. But, in any case, the time-
complex can be thought, with “speculation” taken 
primarily as a time-historical speculation, like 
futurity, rather than an exteriority to experience 
or an exteriority of thought. This brings us 
much closer to current business and technical 
operations rather than the conceptual demands  
of speculative realism. 
Operationalizing the  
Speculative Time-Complex
SM 
One instructive manifestation of the 
operationalized speculative time complex is 
derivatives. Of course, derivatives are now key to 
speculative finance, and they are “speculative” 
in that they use the unknown future price of an 
asset and the risks involved therein to draw profits 
against a present price. As Elena Esposito clearly 
shows, with derivatives the uncertainties of the 
future are used to construct prices in the present 
and this scrambles the standard time structure 
of past-present-future. The derivative is a clear 
example of how profits are not extracted on the 
basis of production or from fixed capital like 
equipment, plant and construction, all of which 
depend upon the history of investment, nor from 
variable capital like labor or wages. These belong 
to traditional industrial models of accumulation, 
in which a factory is built, workers are employed 
and paid, materials are used at a certain price, 
a product made or grown, then sold at a higher 
price than the costs, and profits made. All of 
which means that the profits are accrued from 
production that has happened in the past and 
subsequently exchanged on the market. The 
exchange of the product is the completion of a 
sequence that must have already happened. With 
the derivative model, on the other hand, a price in 
the future which is yet to happen is anticipated, 
and it is this future eventuality which is unknown 
that is operationalized to extract profits—on the 
basis, to reiterate, of a future that is unknown  
and unactualized. 
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Derivatives are, in Natalia Zuluaga’s phrase,  
a specific kind of future-mining, an extraction from 
the future in the present, but this mining of the 
future in the present changes what the present is: 
the present isn’t the one that you started with.  
The very construction of a speculatively 
constituted present—the “pre-”—actively puts 
the present into a past that it also is, the “post-
”. There’s one version of this configuration 
that you and others have described through 
pre-emptive policing, pre-emptive strikes, pre-
emptive personality and so on, which are also 
anticipated through big data, and the use of 
algorithms through consumer information. But it 
also diﬀers from the logic of preemption where, 
taking the example of a preemptive strike, you 
eliminate a possible enemy in order to prevent 
what might have happened—but which also may 
not. It’s rather that your act— price setting in 
the case of derivatives, but the construction is 
generalizable—is itself modified because you 
take this very proximate future into account as a 
condition of the act that should then be made. The 
future is acting now to transform the present even 
before the present has happened. As Esposito 
argues, it is not only the linear schematic of time 
that is scrambled, but also the very openness of 
the present to the future. 
But aren’t these 
conditions what you 
and Anke Henning  
were also dealing with 
in your Speculative 
Poetics project, be 
it more in relation to 
formal literary and 
linguistic analysis?⁴ 
⁴ See [http://www.
spekulative-poetik.
de/programmatik-
der-reihe/english.
htmlhttp://www.
spekulative-poetik.de/
programmatik-der-
reihe/english.html]
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AA 
Anke and I wanted to problematize certain 
initial assumptions, such as the very easy and 
oversimplified tension between speculative 
realism and poststructuralism. You and I also 
sought to rework that opposition with the essays 
collected in Genealogies of Speculation, which 
looks to vindicate a speculative dimension in the 
philosophy of the last decades.⁵ But, in particular, 
Anke and I explored 
how a prehistory of  
the current speculative 
philosophy took up 
the idea of speculative 
temporality.
SM 
One of the things you 
and Anke do in Present 
Tense, which is really 
important to emphasize 
here, is to introduce 
grammar structures within language as a kind of 
time-complex.⁶  Language for you seems to be a 
cognitive, plastic and manipulable medium of the 
time-complex.
AA
Language has one unique and key feature in 
this regard: a tense system. The tense system 
is really important to our understanding and 
construction of time, even more fundamental 
than the experience of time because it structures 
that experience—though not in a relativist sense. 
Most continental philosophies of language or 
⁵ Armen Avanessian 
and Suhail Malik, 
Genealogies of 
Speculation (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2016).
⁶ Armen Avanessian 
and Anke Hennig, 
Present Tense. A 
Poetic (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2015).
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time actually don’t deal with what is specific to 
this system because they don’t really focus on 
the grammar. It’s a problem with phenomenology 
as well as with a lot of deconstructivist and 
post-structuralist philosophies. What is more 
instructive than those traditions has been analytic 
philosophy and non-Saussurean linguistics. For 
example, John McTaggart and Gustave Guillaume 
think a lot about sentences like “every past 
was a future” and “every future will be a past.” 
These basic structural paradoxes—or apparent 
structural paradoxes—can be tackled via an 
analysis of grammar. There are some important 
technical issues here that I had better not  
go into—
  
SM 
Yes, maybe later. The core point seems to be  
that formulations like “every past was a future” 
and “every future will be a past”—  
AA 
And so on: every present as well—  
SM 
That’s what I was going to say: what’s very 
relevant about those two formulations, in 
particular to the identification of the speculative 
time-complex we are here calling the post-
contemporary, is that they articulate a time 
structuring in which the present drops out.  
So determinations of time can be established  
that don’t require the present as their basis. 
The tense structure of language allows for that, 
formulating the non-necessity of the present as  
a structuring condition of the tense structure.
AA 
And what struck me as necessary for speculative 
realism or any kind of speculative philosophy 
was a better understanding of what I would call a 
speculative and materialist temporality. For Anke 
and me, this meant understanding time on the 
basis of the grammatical structures of language— 
language understood as something material— 
and to develop not a time-philosophy but rather  
a tense-philosophy.
SM 
At the same time, you make the criticism that 
speculative realism, as we mainly have it, doesn’t 
24 25
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take ordinary or literary language seriously 
enough because it consigns it to correlationism— 
meaning, eﬀectively, the dimension of human 
experience that never leaves itself.
AA 
Yes, but that’s their self-misunderstanding. 
SM 
And why did you call it speculative poetics? 
AA 
Because our work also implies a polemic against 
aesthetics and the general focus on aisthesis 
[perception] in modern philosophy; and, to return 
to your earlier point, also against the primacy  
of experience. 
SM 
By “constructive,” do you mean that tense can 
be operationalized in order to structure time 
diﬀerently? The sentences formulating that the 
past was the future and eclipsing the present 
are not just descriptive. They also construct time 
relations within language, especially through 
narrative. Does the same operationalization of 
tense happen outside of human languages,  
for example through the derivative structures  
we mentioned?
AA 
The point is rather that “experience” of time and 
the construction of something like chronological 
time are only eﬀects of grammar, not a 
representation of the direction of time or of what 
time really is. It’s the tenses in language that 
create an ontology of chronological time for us, 
and we live this time as the illusion of having  
a biography. 
SM 
Isn’t this limitation of consecutive ordering what 
the speculative time-complex surpasses? What 
we have with the speculative time-complex is 
that the future, which includes the future we don’t 
know, gets included within the current reckoning 
and the present is coming disconnected from the 
past. The dismantling of the linear ordering and 
the primacy of the present equalizes past, present 
and future.
AA 
Absolutely. Some of today’s fiction and, more 
precisely, present-tense novels are far more 
dangerous than traditional narrative in really 
forcing time out of joint. As the result of 20th 
century vangardisms, present-tense novels 
subject readers to a speculative somatics of time. 
Maybe A.N. Whitehead would call this mode of 
sentience “feeling.” This time does indeed “feel” 
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hallucinogenic, haunting, urging, hyperstitious, 
horrific, as David Roden shows in his contribution 
to this issue. In short, one feels time’s power 
coming from the future. In the most radical 
case this speculative feeling makes you change 
your life. Becoming on a par with the future you 
have speculated initiates a metanoia. But this 
goes very far…. The temporal phenomenon 
we were interested in is how all the aesthetic 
understanding of literature doesn’t understand 
that the present tense produces asynchrony.
SM 
Asynchrony?
AA 
That the present is not fully experienceable but 
is split in itself, and that tense structures can 
actively operationalize this splitting. It is laden 
with innumerable past-presents. It presents 
actual phenomena as post-X phenomena and it 
desynchronizes time. 
Left and Right  
Contemporaneity
SM 
This comes back to what we were saying earlier: 
that the future itself becomes part of the present. 
This could be taken as an extension of the present 
without a future radically distinct from it. And 
it often is, with the leftist-critical claim of the 
loss of futurity under the capitalism of complex 
societies. That is the fundamental limitation of 
contemporary leftism that Nick Srnicek and Alex 
Williams have identified, and which they look to 
countermand with their specific determination 
of what, in their contribution to this issue, they 
identify to be “a better future,” which provides an 
active horizon to direct the politics of the present.
AA 
I think we have a slight disagreement on the 
current state of neoliberalism, which you define 
as a state-business nexus directed to the 
concentration of capital and power, which requires 
and consolidates increasingly autocratic elites. 
I tend to think that we are already going past 
this stage. For me and others, neoliberalism 
is a move toward something one can call 
financial neofeudalism, in which key columns 
or foundations of the political economy of 
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capitalism—like a safe nation-state, a governed 
population and a market regulating itself, or 
other basic economic assumptions like economic 
recovery or growth leading to more jobs or higher 
profits leading to greater competition instead 
of monopolies or oligopolies etc.—have started 
to disappear, and we are now in a fundamental 
financial and social crisis, with increasing depth  
of inequality. 
But instead of debating whether we are 
at a new financial feudalism or just another 
stage in capitalism, let’s instead focus here on 
the basic hypothesis we are jointly proposing: 
given the social, technological, and political 
transformations since the 1960s and 70s  
that we’ve already mentioned, and which are  
also embodied in contemporary art and in 
literature with the emergence and consolidation 
of the present tense novel in the period since, 
we live in a new, speculative time structure. 
There have been basically two responses to 
this transformation. On the one side, there is 
a right-wing or reactionary countermanding, 
looking toward the past as a kind of counter-
balance against the negative aspects that 
everyone observes and feels: the frustrations, 
disadvantages and mistakes of neoliberal 
financial neofeudalism. The other standard 
response to the speculative time structure is  
the left or critical one, which is also the  
prevalent one in contemporary art. The focus  
here is not the past as a place of semantic 
security but instead on the present as a site or 
condition of resistance against the change to  
a speculative time. 
Yet, for all the contentions between left- 
critical and right-reactionary responses to the 
emergence of the neoliberal mobilization of the 
speculative time-complex, both are just playing in 
diﬀerent ways into the hands of this new formation 
of neoliberal capitalism, or financial feudalism. 
It’s perhaps more obvious with the right-wing 
reactionary tendencies, which in no way disrupt 
but rather reinforce power structures that enabled 
the new social, economic, political formation. 
However, with left-critical reactions too, there 
is a kind of suﬀocation, to the extent that most 
people have the feeling of not being able to gain 
traction in the present, to change something, 
and to have something like a future worthy of its 
name. Contemporary art is both a symptom and 
surrogate of that futurelessness, with its constant 
celebration of experience: aesthetic experience, 
criticality, presentness and so on.
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SM 
That is an instructive formulation of typical left 
and right reactions, and typical defensive moves 
around the emergence of the speculative time-
complex with the loss of bearings that it institutes 
in relationship to both the past and the future. 
Though there are many ways of understanding 
or setting up a relationship to the speculative 
time-complex, what the right does is to simplify 
it, to reduce it as a complex, and to recenter it 
on the present as the dominant moment on the 
basis of tradition. The right has always done 
this in modernity: if modernity is a paradigm in 
which the new happens in the now, what has 
characterized the right is a defense against the 
emergence of the new as the basis for actions, 
social organizations, aesthetics, meaning and so 
on. The authority of past conditions is invoked 
as a stabilization mechanism for modernization. 
To be clear: the right is not necessarily against 
modernization but stabilizes its disruptive 
eﬀects by calling on what are then necessarily 
conservative or reactive historical formations. 
And faced with operationalized speculative time-
complex of neoliberal capitalism, the right can 
in a way carry on doing what it has always done 
without necessarily recognizing that what it is 
reacting against is no longer the modern but a 
new condition. 
The Rightism of neoliberalism makes sense 
on this basis: even though I disagree with the 
adequacy of the phrase “financial neofeudalism” 
to describe what is happening in capitalism now, 
it nonetheless serves to capture the increasing 
autocracy that goes along with the neoliberal 
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restructuring. The political question then is  
how that autocratic, post-democratic kind of 
power is to be legitimized. The right is very useful 
just here because what they endorse, essentially,  
is the authority of a recognized historical or  
elite formation that stabilizes semantics— 
and perhaps only semantics—in the newly 
established conditions.
AA 
And the left-critical abreaction?
SM 
In a way, leftism makes the problem of “the 
contemporary” more evident because the left 
in its progressive forms has been attached to 
modernism. The now in which the new takes place 
is the fetish for change for the progressive left, 
exemplified by its revolutionary ideals and clichés. 
The left’s abreaction to the speculative time-
complex is to retrench the present as the venue 
or the site for thinking about and confronting the 
reconstitution of social and time organization,  
and semantic reorganization too. Instead of 
seeing the future as condition of the present, the 
present is instead taken to extend out indefinitely 
and cancel out the radically diﬀerent future (the 
revolution, notably). 
But the speculative present as we are 
identifying it is, by contrast to this leftist 
melancholy, the entrenchment of the future and 
the past which folds into the present, in a way that 
certainly deprioritizes it and maybe even makes it 
drop out—as in the phrases demonstrating tense 
structures we discussed earlier. The past was the 
future, and the future will be the past.
AA 
There is no critical interruption from the present  
in this speculative present.
SM 
No, it’s constructed by the uncertainties of the 
future and the absence of the past.
AA
That’s why the left-critical thinking of the event  
or the emptiness or openness of the present— 
of contemporaneity—is still vestigially modernist. 
And, as Laboria Cuboniks remark in their 
contribution from several diﬀerent angles, it’s 
not adequate to the tasks and conditions of the 
twenty-first century. 
34 35
Th
e 
S
pe
cu
la
tiv
e 
Ti
m
e 
C
om
pl
ex
Ar
m
en
 A
va
ne
ss
ia
n 
an
d 
S
uh
ai
l M
al
ik
SM 
What the left sees in the speculative 
complexification of time is an extension of the 
present rather than its thinning out by the forcing 
of the future or the disestablishment of the past. 
Historical, futural, anticipatory relationships are 
maintained with an emphatic insistence on the 
presentness of action, aesthetics or experience. 
This is insistence on “the contemporary.” It is 
still premised on the present as the primary 
tense. And what happens with the emphasis on 
contemporaneity is a determination of the present 
as indefinitely extended. The contemporary is a 
time form that saturates both the past and the 
future, a metastable condition. 
A leftism still attached to modernism won’t 
have traction on the speculative present, even 
if that leftism is more attentive to the time-
complex than the right because it’s not trying to 
restore a past (though its revolutionary wing does 
seem largely interested in restoring a historical 
semantics, while its social-democratic wing now 
maintains an interest in failed market solutions). 
Even if it’s accepted that the left is more open to 
modernity than the right (which is questionable 
outside of the left’s self-reinforcing phantasm), it 
holds that the present extends into both the past 
and into the future, which supposedly destroys  
the future as a future. And, as Esposito remarks  
in her contribution to this issue, it doesn’t see  
that what it is actually involved with is the future  
now. That today is tomorrow, as you put it in  
an-other occasion.
AA 
It was “Tomorrow 
Today.”⁷ 
SM 
Exactly. That title indexes 
how the speculative 
present is in a pre-post 
formation, or post-
contemporary. The 
present now is not 
the time in which the 
decisions are made or  
the basis for the new,  
as it was in modernism. 
The new is happening instead in a transition 
between a past and a future that is not a 
unidirectional flux, but a speculative construction in 
or from the directions of past and present at once. 
⁷ see [https://
viennabusines-
sagency.at/cre-
ative-industries/
curated-by-vienna/
about-curated-by- 
vienna/concept/
https://viennab-
usinessagency.at/
creative-industries/
curated-by-vi-
enna/about-cu-
rated-by-vienna/
concept/].
36 37
Th
e 
S
pe
cu
la
tiv
e 
Ti
m
e 
C
om
pl
ex
Ar
m
en
 A
va
ne
ss
ia
n 
an
d 
S
uh
ai
l M
al
ik
AA 
The whole idea of what in German is called 
Zeitgenossenschaft—the contemporary, more 
literally, “comrade of time”—is problematic 
because it far too often signifies the wish to 
change the present completely with an insistence 
on the present. The contemporaneity of 
Zeitgenossenschaft indicates the idea of having 
traction in the present by getting closer to it, 
and that is no longer adequate to the task. It is 
simply the wrong way to think. What is needed 
instead is neither Gegenwartsgenossenschaft—
comradeship of the present, nor 
Vergangenheitsgenossenschaft— comradeship 
of the past, but rather a Zeitgenossenschaft 
from the future (die Zukunft), a kind of 
Zukunftsgenossenschaft. We need to become 
comrades with and of the future and approach  
the present from that direction.
An Aesthetics of  
Everything: Contemporary Art  
Contra Futurity
SM 
Under the guise of the contemporary the 
modernist left has a kind of melancholia for a 
future that it cancels to preserve its received 
premise: the present. The past and the future 
are taken as modifications of the present. 
The advantage for left-criticality is that 
the contemporary can then accommodate, 
dissimilate, colonize all of time in its own 
terms. This is really evident in contemporary 
art, which becomes a kind of last word in 
art. It cancels even its own futurity if not the 
future in general for the sake of its own critical 
accomplishments, which are of course capture- 
mechanisms demonstrating contemporary art’s 
accomplishment.
AA 
Contemporary art is a good example also 
because it has not been just a victim of the 
recent economic and political reordering of 
neoliberalism, but has really helped build the 
matrix of that reorganization by implementing 
its logic on all levels from a left-critical angle. 
Specifically, it has stressed the dominance of the 
present or the past as condition for action, and 
also, as we said before, individuated experience 
as the main benefit of that reorganization. It takes 
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AA 
An aesthetic experience not just of art, but of 
everything.
SM 
Yes, the aestheticization of experience, or 
experience as an aesthetic. That is also a 
generalization of ethics too: the appreciation of 
diﬀerences without political demand, a kind of 
superliberal—
AA 
De-politicization…
SM 
A depoliticization because it’s a de-systematization. 
Such an aesthetic/ethical appreciation is 
a repudiation—indirectly made, as a kind 
of background condition—against making 
systemic determinations. The latter are held to 
be too complex to be apprehended or reworked, 
impossible or just wrong-headed because 
totalitarian. What we are obliged to be restricted 
to are instead only the singularities of what is and 
of experiences. That is certainly the injunction of 
the lead in a general aestheticization at all levels: 
personal/individual creativity, originality etc.; 
environment and cities as spaces of creativity and 
“disruptive” entrepreneurialism; the conflation of 
production and consumption with the prosumer, 
whose “natural” habitat is, precisely, the smart 
city itself turned into a kind-of continual biennial 
event. All of this goes back to the fetishization of 
presentness and of the aesthetic experience of 
everyday life at the expense of its reconstruction, 
which would be the task of poiesis or a poetics. 
SM 
Via the continued enrichment of experience 
through an aesthetic encounter, contemporary art 
also draws attention to specifics and particulars 
at the cost of systemic understanding. Victoria 
Ivanova draws attention to this operational logic 
in her contribution to this issue, linking it to the 
human rights regime as a kind-of counterpart 
in global ordering that constructs the relation 
between universality and particulars after the 
so-called “end of history.” 
Let’s be clear that this is not a condition 
of stasis: contemporary art is integrated into 
neoliberalism’s enrichment of experience for its 
elite beneficiaries, and those thereabouts, in a 
way that promotes change and revision. This is 
part of the complexity of the speculative present 
of neoliberal capitalist development: it looks like 
a personal good, an enrichment of experiment 
by aestheticization, by promoting change while 
maintaining a certain stability—
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contemporary art, operating via each artwork and 
its social norms. And to that extent it is a minor 
but paradigmatic model for a neoliberal sociality, 
as Ivanova remarks.
The way in which contemporary art becomes 
a plaything for big power in neoliberalism, despite 
many of art’s critical content claims against that 
model of domination, this convergence makes 
coherent sense on this basis. But what needs  
to be emphasized here is that rather than  
just remaining at the level of the conflation of 
varieties of anarcho-leftism in contemporary  
art’s critical claims with the rightist interests  
of increasingly concentrated capital and power,  
the two can be seen to have common interests in 
flattening out or simplifying the speculative time 
complex, as reactive detemporalizations of the  
speculative present. 
What is necessary against these and other 
such reactions is to have strategies and praxes— 
and that means theories—to gain traction in the 
speculative present. And that is what both right-
wing conservative strategies and left-critical 
or aesthetic approaches are utterly incapable 
of doing. As we’ve said, both are combined in 
contemporary art which is then also incapable of 
doing anything but consolidating this condition, 
no matter what it claims to do, what it pretends  
to do, or what its content claims are. “We should 
not be afraid of establishing meaning.”
AA
We agree that we have to think and act within  
a post-contemporary speculative time-complex. 
But now the question is: how to diﬀer from 
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the capitalist or financial-feudalistic version 
of it? How does a speculative theory introduce 
a diﬀerence into the speculative present from 
its exploitative formation by neoliberalism, 
however else we might characterize that form of 
domination? What would be a speculative politics 
capable of accelerating the time-complex, in the 
sense of introducing a diﬀerence to it?
SM 
That is the fundamental political question, for 
sure. One further theoretical point might help us 
understand the diﬃculties here. Namely, why is 
our wish to get past contemporaneity not just 
Jacques Derrida’s criticism of the metaphysics of 
presence? For Derrida, presence is the primary 
category of western metaphysics, circumscribing 
not just the main philosophical doctrines in the 
Western tradition but also correlative prevailing 
social, political and language formations. And 
Derrida proposes that the present held to be 
adequate to itself needs to be dismantled and 
reconstituted. For him, the task is to deconstruct 
presence—ontologically, in time, space, and so 
on. We are contending that that contemporaneity 
is no less an extended social historical present, 
presentification. So, in a way, aren’t we just doing 
Derrida again, even though he is a key figure in 
the critical lineage that needs to be surpassed?
AA
It’s not the worst thing to be repeating Derrida 
to some extent. But with his deconstruction, it’s 
a necessarily ongoing process of the ideology or 
eﬀect of presentness establishing itself and also 
being deconstructed: Metaphysics needs to be 
deconstructed and it deconstructs itself all the 
time, so it’s an unending procedure. Unfortunately, 
this goes down all too well with a tedious modernist 
aesthetic of the negative, not so far away from the 
fetishes of Frankfurt School, of the non-identical, 
or of a “diﬀérance” that plays with the opposition 
between meaning or content, traditionally the bad 
thing, and subtraction, which is the good thing, 
as are emptiness and non-readability. And I think 
that’s a very modernist, twentieth century logic, and 
also the logic of the contemporary. Contrary to all 
such attempts, the reworking of the speculative 
present must admit that meaning is always there 
anyway, and the constant procedure of changing 
and subtracting it endorsed by Derrida and the 
lineage of critique he belongs to is not necessarily 
something positive. 
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So, with deconstruction and most other strands 
of last century’s aesthetic philosophy, whatever 
its other merits are, you end up in an aesthetics 
that is an ongoing celebration of the gesture of 
interruption, of emptying out, and so on (just think 
of some of Badiou’s tedious disciples). But with the 
speculative time-complex we are no longer in that 
logic of interruption. I don’t have a problem with 
an ontology of time, as long as it gives us another 
possibility of understanding time than via the 
present.
SM 
You are right to say Derrida ends up in an 
aesthetics. But it is also an ethics, with its 
emphasis of an always singular and irreconcilable 
experience of vulnerability. He rails against 
established meaning. 
AA 
We should not be afraid of establishing meaning. 
On the contrary.
SM 
Certainly. I don’t know if my additional observation 
is compatible with your response, but it’s that 
the construction of the speculative time-complex 
is the societal—meaning mainly technical and 
economic—operation of the deconstruction of 
presence. That is, the way that semantics or 
instrumental operations are occasioned in time-
complex societies is precisely the deconstruction 
of presence and meaning in the way that Derrida 
aﬃrmed. We are then no longer in a metaphysics 
of presence because of the speculative time-
complex. Derrida speaks to this somewhat 
in his discussion of teletechnologies and the 
displacements of space, locality, and ontology 
that are involved.⁸ But the politically diﬃcult and 
mostly evaded point in 
these discussions is 
that the sought-after 
deconstruction of time, 
meaning and so on are 
actually taking place 
though processes of 
capitalization. The 
“they” of the state-
business nexus eﬀectuated that deconstruction, 
and they did it better than Derrida. In this 
light, what “the contemporary” enforces is 
the retrenchment of presence against its 
deconstruction by the speculative time-complex. 
Contemporaneity here includes all the procedures 
⁸ Jacques Derrida 
and Bernard Stiegler, 
Echographies 
of Television: 
Filmed Interviews 
(Cambridge: Polity, 
2002).
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of interruption, subtraction, delay and non-identity 
you mention, as well as many others including 
semantic deconstruction. 
Grammar of the  
Speculative Present
SM 
To return to your question: in contrast to the 
sorry complex of right and left reactions to the 
speculative present that is contemporaneity 
in art and elsewhere, what is needed is a way 
to engage with the time-complex that is not 
just about drawing profits and exacerbating 
exploitation on this revised basis, as neoliberalism 
has so successfully done. That capitalized 
formation of the time-complex is a kind of limited 
and restricted organization of the speculative 
present; one that for all of its complexity reverts 
to presentification because the profits have to 
be accumulated now as per the short-termism of 
neoliberal capitalism.
AA 
The problem is that one has to admit that the 
social, technological, political and economic 
formation of neoliberalism has an advantage 
because it acts within the speculative temporality, 
in part as it has established institutions 
functioning in accordance with this speculative 
logic. But the neoliberal formation also 
reduces the speculative dimension of the time-
complex because it repudiates the openness or 
contingency of the future as well as the present. 
SM 
No, I disagree. I think the problem precisely is 
that it opens up more societal and semantic 
contingency. That is what Ulrich Beck and others 
involved in the notion of “risk societies” diagnosed 
in the 1990s on other terms.⁹ What they call risk is 
the acknowledgement 
in the present of how 
the speculative time-
complex opens up the 
future as the condition 
for a societal order 
(more accurately,  
a quasi-order).
⁹ Ulrich Beck, Risk 
Society: Towards 
a New Modernity 
(London: SAGE, 
1992).
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alternative actualizations of the speculative 
or asynchronous present; are there diﬀerent 
readings of it? In her contribution, Aihwa Ong 
highlights some of these constructions in her 
anthropology of what she calls “cosmopolitan 
science.” She outlines how the universalisms 
and abstractions intrinsic to scientific 
entrepreneurialism support and are supported 
in Asia by specific historical-culture formations 
of meaning, scrambling any simple opposition 
between local and universals, or between 
past (culture) and future (entrepreneurial 
technoscience). With speculative poetics, to 
take another example, the issue is how do we 
understand the future in an open way and not just 
as a kind of indicative future. 
SM 
What do you mean by “indicative”?
AA 
There are three modes in grammar: the imperative 
(“Go!”), the indicative (“She goes.”), and  
the conjunctive (“I could go.”). In language  
philosophy—but also politically—it’s important 
AA 
No, no. The contemporary is a constant 
production of innovations and diﬀerences, but it 
doesn’t introduce a diﬀerence to the recursive 
movement of time. The German allows for 
distinction between Beschleunigung, which is 
acceleration as a speeding up, and Akzeleration. 
The latter really means something like, in the 
old days, when a clock was too fast. A deviation 
ahead—not a circular movement, but a recursive 
one. Akzeleration introduced a kind of diﬀerence 
to the functionality of the clock. And it’s this 
diﬀerence that the neoliberal or neofeudal 
economic system hardly allows for, because it 
produces an automatized future. While the kind 
of criticism typical of the contemporary (left) art 
is not wrong, it doesn’t see the possibilities of 
speculative time and reduces it to the present. It 
just sees the capitalist eﬀects of it. Contemporary 
critical art mostly produces diﬀerent—essentially, 
decorative—objects or meanings that maintain 
the reduced form of the speculative time-complex. 
And I am arguing not on the level of just semantic 
meaning, but really on the level of the materiality 
of language and the materiality of time, which are 
not separable.
SM
So the task of the post-contemporary against 
contemporaneity is to change time?
AA 
The post-contemporary works within the 
speculative present. It understands it, it practices 
it, and it shapes our temporality. Are there 
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to understand that all tenses are modal. The 
past and the present have to be understood in 
a modal way—primarily as indicative. But the 
future tense and the conjunctive mode are pretty 
close in that they both deploy the grammar of 
possibility. It is this contingency that is reduced 
by the logic of the contemporary logic and is often 
misunderstood by the closure of speculative time 
to the present (“I will have gone”). But, if I may 
get a bit more into the technical analysis, the 
conjunctive is constructed before you are actually 
going, so whether you are using the conjunctive 
mode or the future tense in the present you are 
not yet going. Maybe that’s too technical for here, 
but the main point is that mode is how a future 
tense is transformed into a present tense and 
subsequently into a past tense. 
SM 
Is the conjunctive the form of contemporaneity? 
What it sets up is a sense that actions could 
have happened, but did not happen: “they would 
or could go,” but they didn’t. And this is a sense 
where the subject of the sentence is left with a 
potentiality, which is unrealized. 
That makes sense of the celebration of 
“potentiality” everywhere across the critical 
left today, and also, again, the limitation of the 
speculative time-complex to the domination by 
the present. Claims in contemporary art and 
contemporaneity are emphatically limited only to 
setting up options with potentials, without actually 
doing anything or mobilizing the speculative 
present to construct a future. The future is only 
and just a set of potentials that must never be 
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actualized for fear of instrumentalization and, 
paradoxically and self-destructively, realizing  
in any present a future radically distinct from  
the present. 
AA 
The reduction of the time-complex to 
contemporaneity does not understand the future 
to be contingent but the only possible future 
present that becomes real; in grammatical terms, 
the future or the present here are understood only 
via the indicative. But the present is not just an 
“is,” just as tenses don’t represent time. We have 
to get rid of an a-modal understanding of time.
SM 
The contemporary is a-modal?
AA 
Yes, and what is needed instead for a thinking and 
praxis adequate to the speculative temporality 
we live in—a Zukunftsgenossenschaft as I called 
it earlier—are means for transforming a future 
tense into a present tense. That’s why for me 
grammar is a way of understanding speculative 
time in its openness, instead of subjecting it 
exclusively to the indicative mode. A future 
happens in the present only if a conjunctive is 
successfully realized, which happens by way of an 
imperative. In between “I could go” (present tense 
conjunctive) and “I go” (future tense indicative) is 
the hidden command “Go!” (imperative).   
For me, it’s exactly this grammatically 
organized diﬀerence that opens up not just a 
diﬀerent future and the possibility to do and 
act diﬀerently in the present instead of being 
subjected to an automatized future, whether 
it’s by preemptive policing or derivatives. More 
generally, we have to understand that language 
changes meaning and time—and on a material 
and ontological level, not just on a linguistic or 
conceptual level. These complexes can be tackled 
via grammatical analyses.
SM 
OK, but as nearly all the contributions to this 
issue demonstrate, we also need to generalize 
the construction of the time-complex beyond 
language and its grammar. The conditions 
we are talking about are made of the broad 
infrastructures and systemics of the speculative 
present in large-scale integrated societies. 
Esposito identifies a scrambling of the time-
line against its received and modernist logics 
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that suggests a new openness to the future, 
which is to the advantage of a relatively new kind 
of capital accumulation but can be mobilized 
otherwise. Ivanova makes the case for how 
a new global juridico-political quasi-order is 
constructed via unstable restagings of the 
relations between particulars and universals, 
while Srnicek and Williams look to the systemic 
techno-social advance of robotics and automation 
to transform the fundament of the capitalist 
rendering of human activity. Benjamin Bratton 
extends these possibilities under the rubric of 
“Speculative Design” to more specific scenarios 
and, simultaneously, along longer time-lines; Ong 
also takes up the jurisdictional and operational 
issues in the specific case of the fabrication 
of a scientific enterprise that makes sense in 
ethno-cultural terms in Asia, transforming the 
practical manifestations of where and how identity 
formation takes place. Laboria Cuboniks wrestle 
with the legacies of feminism given just such 
futural and technoscientific reorganization of 
bodies, identities, and concepts of selfhood; and 
Roden scrambles body, aﬀect, language in light 
of a “Disconnection Thesis” according to which 
the kinds of intelligence inaugurated by Artificial 
General Intelligence completely change the space 
of coding at any and every order. 
In general, and similarly to the insuﬃciency 
of experience as a basis for apprehending 
the speculative present, the constructions of 
(presumably only some) human languages is 
only part of this integrated complex but not 
wide enough as a mechanism to meet the broad 
material and semiotic condition. 
AA 
We need more than a language theory, for sure, 
but in any case we need what I call a “poetic 
understanding” which, for me, is informed by 
language theory instead of an aesthetic one.
SM 
My divergence is that, first, even taking poetics 
as a name for production in general, it still 
seems to me to be too tied into the structures 
and aﬀordances of more or less ordinary human 
language and their ordering. That’s of course 
a fundamental condition of the systemic, 
social, technological, economic structuring 
and mediation necessary for large-scale 
organization. So, while poetics as you present 
it gives us as human linguistic actors a way of 
reordering the speculative time-complex in other 
formats than the kind of repressive mechanisms 
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On Speculative Design
—Benjamin H. Bratton
 
of contemporaneity and what you identify 
as the indicative, it’s also necessary that the 
restructuring are operationalized also in non- 
linguistic terms. We have to open up the time-
complex in its infrastructures that are more 
structured in terms other than those of human 
languages. This is what Bratton’s proposal of 
Speculative Design in this issue puts forward in 
concrete ways and with specific situations and 
time-lines, not least with his identification of 
“The Stack,” which rearranges sovereign power 
according to the material and infrastructural 
conditions of computation that is interconnected 
at a planetary scale. Even more generally, 
however, we need a grammar adequate to the 
expansive infrastructure of the time-complex in  
its widest formation.
Revised transcript of  
a conversation held in  
Berlin, 29 January 2016. 
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Speculative Design (SD) understands itself as a 
progressive alternative perspective to mainstream 
Design culture (and as an alternative to other 
alternatives as well).1 It knows that “Design” is 
not some magical way 
of thinking (involving 
stick-up notes, big  
pens, and colored 
beanbags) that just 
makes things better 
by “building trust,” 
“understanding the 
customer” or “getting 
a seat at the table,” 
or similar. Design is 
also the means by 
which pathological 
relationships to 
material culture are 
made more eﬃcient and 
more delightful, and we 
are worse for it. Some 
may even conclude that 
the job of Design in the 
21st century is to undo 
(much of) the Design  
of 20th.  But may  
also be to re-claim and re-launch other frustrated 
Modern impulses that were dry-docked by 
century’s end, not only designing things—widgets, 
withdrawn objects, manifest subjectivities, 
formal forms, etc.—but also designing the 
relations between them: systems, supply-chains, 
encounters, obligations, accounting protocols, 
signal-niche-population dynamics, and so on.
¹ The following is 
edited version of 
remarks delivered 
on February 10, 
2016 at “Alternative 
Modernities: The 
Past, Present, 
and Future of 
Speculative Design” 
symposium, held 
at the University of 
California, San Diego, 
La Jolla, to mark 
the launch of the 
Speculative Design 
undergraduate major 
in the Department 
of Visual Arts. They 
proceeded the 
keynote address by 
Fiona Raby.   
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Speculation is not ephemeral or disengaged. 
The prevalence and proliferation of models 
of risk patterns, ideal options, and plotted-
outcomes underscores that speculation is not a 
supplemental or marginal process. It is less airy-
fairy than nuts and bolts: whether for commodities 
and equities futures, automated A/B testing, 
enterprise reinsurance or weather forecasting, the 
global economy functions by speculative models 
of the near or long-term future.² But if so, does 
this disqualify the speculative from the figuring 
of fundamental alternatives? It does not. Instead 
of concluding that the future (and futurism per 
se) is lost, we should commandeer modeling 
infrastructures for better and more vibrant 
purposes. For this, speculative models are rotated 
from one purpose to another: less to predict what 
is most likely to happen (deriving value from 
advance simulation of given outcomes) than to 
search the space of actual possibility (even and 
especially beyond what any of us would otherwise 
conceive.)³ That is, predictive models are 
adaptive because they need to be descriptive, but 
for speculation, models are prescriptive because 
they need to become normative. Between 
them we track diﬀerent uses for contingency, 
imminence, simulation, navigation, resistance, 
governmentality, universality, neutrality, etc.⁴  
That is where Design becomes designation.⁵
² A/B testing is a 
common technique 
in, for example, web 
advertising in which 
two creative options 
for an ad both go 
live and actual user 
engagement with 
each is carefully 
measured. That 
data is used to 
make changes in 
one or both ads 
so as to optimize 
its performance 
in relation to 
established goals. 
In this, a traditional 
role of creative 
expertise to intuit the 
single best version 
is subordinated 
to an automated 
scanning and testing 
of variables. What 
proves to be the 
most important 
variable may be 
something that was 
never considered by 
the Design team in 
advance, but which 
should alter their 
mental models of the 
user’s mental models 
henceforth.  
³ This rotation 
from decoration to 
designation tracks 
with some points 
(but not others) 
from Bruno Latour’s 
address “A Cautious 
Prometheus? A 
Few Steps Toward 
a Philosophy of 
Design (with Special 
Attention to Peter 
Sloterdijk)” Networks 
of Design, meeting 
of the Design History 
Society. Falmouth, 
Cornwall, 3rd 
September 2008.  
⁴ In these regards, 
the connotations of 
the “speculative” to 
which I’m speaking 
parallels some claims 
made on behalf of 
hyperstition—the 
movement of the 
fictional and the 
potential to the real 
and the actual. In the 
particular context 
of Design, that 
metamorphosis is not 
only toward the actual 
but also toward a 
normative, embedded 
material governance.   
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Futurism, Scale
For obvious reasons it 
is commonly presumed 
that there must be an 
overlap between SD 
and the more general 
pursuit of Design 
Futures, or prototypes 
from the worlds of 
tomorrow. Sometimes 
there are clear 
alignments, especially 
for SD projects that 
address “the future” 
explicitly as critical 
subject matter. As I 
put it elsewhere, in our 
culture speaking about 
“the future” is a way of 
saying things about 
the present—critical, 
utopian, projective, 
pragmatic and/or 
simply unspeakable 
things—but too often 
it is an alibi for saying 
nothing at all.⁶ “The 
future” is that place 
where skateboards 
hover and ambient 
fields of graphical user-interfaces are slightly 
more elysian; it is a rhetorical sink where half-
baked marketing plans usurp the place where 
actual ideas are supposed to go.
Given this, we may expect a more intellectually 
and politically rigorous SD to resist—or even 
eliminate—futurity as a key concept or site 
condition. Some might insist that it focus 
instead on the most immediate at-hand frames 
of spatial and temporal reference, and to deal 
with coming conditions largely through the hard 
or soft survivalist aesthetics that ensue. “There 
is no time, and there is only this place” may be 
the rationale for this emergency interventionism. 
Others  lament that facts on the ground are out-
of-sync with fragmented social history. They hint 
that until recent times sociological “cognitive 
maps,” on the one hand, and systemic historical 
unfolding, on the other, may have been in conflict 
but at least their common ground felt solid. For 
this perspective, the answer to the malaise of 
network culture is to re-glue the scale and tempo 
of global forces back to the dialectic parameters 
of social and psychological history.
I argue that these are both insuﬃcient 
responses, and that any detected derangement of 
familiar spatial and temporal scales is not only not 
pathological, but may be a precondition for any 
properly calibrated Design imaginary. Design, as 
we know, can adhere to small, medium, large or 
extra-large spatial scales (a single object, a large 
architecture, an urbanism or a transcontinental 
system). It can also be trained on very short- or 
very long-term durations (now, later, much 
later, afterwards) suited to instantaneous user 
response, the next launch cycle, the lifecycle of 
a city, or a geologic trace). We may presume 
that large scales and long durations are natural 
matches, but there is no reason to hold fast to 
⁵ “The Moderns” are 
largely unnamed 
collective villain in 
Bruno Latour, An 
Inquiry Into the 
Modes of Existence: 
an Anthropology 
of the Moderns 
(Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University 
Press, 2013). Based 
on his descriptions, 
they may include a 
cohort as diverse as 
Joseph Conrad, Jack 
Ma, Herbie Hancock, 
and Denis Diderot. 
On the problematic 
“future,” see also 
both Lee Edelman’s 
psychoanalytic 
qualifications 
of futurism and 
heteronormative 
natalism.  
⁶ See my “We Need to 
Talk About TED” The 
Guardian, December 
30, 2015. 
 
64 65
O
n 
S
pe
cu
la
tiv
e 
D
es
ig
n
B
en
ja
m
in
 H
. B
ra
tt
on
this. Very small-scale spatial projects with very 
long duration ramifications are as likely as very 
large-scale spatial projects with instantaneous 
durations, and so we can imagine a combinatory 
matrix of spatial and temporal scales for design 
analysis and intervention. It is not here and now 
versus there and then.
In such a matrix, each temporal scale has its 
own version of “the future” and some are more 
interesting to SD than others. There is a social 
future, with an attendant duration measured in 
fashion cycles or communal memory of place; a 
technical future, with its cycles of product SKU 
turnover and mechanic evolution; a historical 
future, with trans-generational undulations of 
friend and enemy, capture and memorialization; 
and a geologic future, with ripples and rhythms 
than span far longer than the genomic coherency 
of any apex species.⁷ Any aﬀective sense of 
order by which each of these futural forms may 
be felt to be in special harmony (geologic future 
in sync with social future, historical future in 
sync with technological future, etc.) is surely 
not an organic state but a broken solipsistic 
illusion. In other words, it takes a special kind 
of anthropocentric naiveté to fully entertain the 
idea that making all design “human scale” would 
be a long-term solution to anything but the most 
pedestrian problems.⁸ The futures that are 
probably most worth designing are those that 
exceed human phenomenology’s intuitive scales 
of anatomically-embedded spatial navigation and 
the temporalities of organism life span. 
It is important to mobilize SD on behalf of 
conditions that are not-yet-existing here and now, 
and for that we must further shed local social 
history’s mooring privilege. That shift does not 
take leave of the concrete materiality of Design, 
quite the contrary. It is only possible by returning 
our attention to one point of origin for modern 
Design: the actual matter of Materialism.
⁷ Product SKU 
(stock keeping 
unit) is defined as 
“a distinct type of 
item for sale, within 
a store’s catalog, 
such as a product 
or service, and all 
attributes associated 
with the item type 
that distinguish 
it from other item 
types. For a product, 
these attributes 
could include, but 
are not limited 
to, manufacturer, 
description, 
material, size, color, 
packaging, and 
warranty terms. 
When a business 
takes an inventory, it 
counts the quantity 
it has of each 
SKU.” In this case, 
we see the SKU 
as the addressing 
mechanism that 
marks the pace of 
evolution for one 
product version to 
the next: as one 
“species” of iPhone 
or dishwashing 
detergent or throw 
pillow gives way to 
its descendent, its 
SKU is retired and 
another takes its 
place. See [https://
en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/
Stock_keeping_unit]. 
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Matter, Materialism
The contemporary project of Design (inclusive 
of SD) is situated by new materials and material 
forms. The emergence of “modern” Design 
was concurrent with the emergence of the 
materials, processes and technologies of 
mass production and distribution: plastics, 
metals, molding, modeling, printing, stamping, 
shipping, replicating, stacking, etc. For the 
Design of what Reyner Banham called “the first 
machine age,” industrial materials allowed for 
the inexpensive distribution of standardized 
designs to a mass society: new matter provided 
for a new Materialism. Chemistry as much as 
economics (probably not so divisible at the end 
of the day) would drive the anthropology of this 
era’s tangible culture. The periodic table of the 
elements, innovated by Mendeleev and others, 
would provide an alphabet for the composition 
of substance and conjugation of form. In turn, 
as techniques became schools of thought and 
designed forms became fixed at certain levels 
of implementation (type and image, shelter, 
apparatus, transportation, etc.), modern Design 
(and Design education) would coalesce around 
corresponding expertise in graphic design, 
industrial design, interaction design, architectural 
design and so on.⁹
⁸ The common sense 
that my point would 
challenge is nicely 
demonstrated by 
the following quote: 
“Artificial intelligence 
has that name for 
a reason—it isn’t 
natural, it isn’t 
human. As Nicholas 
Carr argues so 
gracefully and 
convincingly in this 
important, insightful 
book, it is time for 
people to regain the 
art of thinking. It is 
time to invent a world 
⁹ There was a time, 
not so long ago, 
when one could go 
to a Design school 
and identify which 
students are in 
which program 
by the equipment 
they carried around 
or sat next to. In 
proximity to Adobe 
and Autodesk’s 
standard application 
suites, it may be 
strange to consider 
that illustration 
students, film 
students, automotive 
where machines are 
subservient to the 
needs and wishes of 
humanity.” —Donald 
Norman, author of 
Things that Make 
Us Smart and 
Design of Everyday 
Things, director of 
the University of 
California San Diego 
Design Lab 
design students, 
fashion students and 
architecture students 
all quite recently 
learned very different 
tools from one 
another. Expertise 
in designing for a 
certain scale of 
material form was 
tied much more 
closely to expertise 
with a particular set 
of equipment, not 
just a particular 
situated techniques 
for their application.  
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Today we confront another gamut of materials 
that is potentially just as transformative. From 
biotechnology to the internet of things to artificial 
intelligence and robotics to networked additive 
manufacturing and replication, this material 
palette provides for the recomposition of the 
world at scales previously unthinkable, turning 
living tissue into a plastic medium and imbuing 
inorganic machines and landscapes with new 
sorts of practical intelligence. The social and 
ecologic project for SD is not only to master an 
articulation of these new registers of matter, 
but also conceive a (real) new Materialism¹⁰ 
that would ratify the 
organization of society 
in the image of their 
still largely-unmapped 
potentials.
For Design practice, 
these material systems 
are of interest to the 
extent that they allow 
for the remaking of 
that world at a more 
granular level, and 
for Design theory to 
the extent that they disenchant and demystify 
something about our world and our species within 
that world. As each of these also now occupies 
some spot on the curve of various hype cycles, 
from wondertech to everyday appliance, the 
incantation of their names supposedly signifies 
futuristic thinking — even when it actually 
does not. The flowering of their potential for 
Promethean demystification and refashioning 
is not automatic; it must be designated. Still, 
it should go without saying that a conjoined 
technological populism and biochemical 
futurism is not unprogressive (and for future 
Wes Andersons, these emerging technologies 
will thematize a pastoral gizmo authentique 
yet-to-come).
The longer-term development of SD and 
related initiatives (not just at UC San Diego 
where I teach, but anywhere) should formulate its 
professional, theoretical and pedagogic expertise 
with this contemporary material palette by putting 
it in contact with other critical experiments and 
active geopolitical and geoeconomic contexts.  
At the same time, the translation of new materials 
into a new program for social and ecological 
organization may also direct the sometimes overly 
self-referential Arts and Humanities toward new 
outward-facing feats of abstraction, rationality, 
and imagination.
Toward that we should not presume that  
the initial applications of any of these 
technologies are those that will define the 
ultimate range of functions, and indeed, as 
discussed below, it is the work of SD to probe  
the contours of that range:
•HAII (Human Artificial Intelligence Interaction 
design) may illuminate unexpected forms of 
empathy, intelligence and identity, and not just in 
the image of human vanity. How will we midwife 
robotics and synthetic embodiment as they 
speciate and incorporate with existing animal 
bodies?
¹⁰ Without being 
too programmatic, 
we can still clearly 
differentiate the 
disenchanted matter-
centric materialism 
that I describe here 
from the mystical 
tropes of much of 
what is recognized as 
New Materialism.   
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•Ubiquitous computation links algorithmic 
calculation from molecular to landscape scale 
and seeds communication between objects 
at, below or above a normal human scale of 
encounter. Urban and continental computational 
assemblages may flow into our lines of sight, 
sound and touch or we may be unable to perceive 
them without sensory augmentation. How do their 
new maps become new territories, and vice versa?
•Synthetic biology, especially its DIY variants, 
suggests plots for organic building-blocks re-cast 
as general purpose programing tools, thus giving 
biotechnology its overdue garageband phase. 
Will biology become more computational before 
computation becomes more biological?
•Epidermal sensors and nanobioelectronics 
combine and weave natural sensation and 
machine sensing so thoroughly that we can’t tell 
which is which, and hint at skin-based media 
and designable sensations: toward a molecular 
gastro-tactility.¹¹ 
What sort of interface 
between inside and 
outside may we wish 
our skin to provide? 
What would we do with 
membranes that communicate, that know, that 
disclose us to the world in other ways?
•Machine vision is to artificial intelligence what 
cilia are to protozoa: a cartographic sensory 
faculty for incipient machinic abstraction. As I’ve 
asked elsewhere, is the real uncanny valley one 
in which we see ourselves through the eyes of 
an AI “other” that we may have programmed, but 
which does not share our aesthetics or motivated 
interpretations?¹²
•More at-hand 
(literally): with more 
humans having access 
to a cell phone than 
to toilets, how for the 
foreseeable future 
will the human hand 
evolve in relation to the 
modular aﬀordances of 
that smart slab/ remote 
control/ homing device/ 
camera obscura/  
cloud tether?
•High-resolution scanning and sensing allows 
us to perceive properties of physical matter at 
a scale and precision otherwise inconceivable, 
making some kinds of metaphysical arguments 
about objects and ontology instantly moot. How 
would a textile culture predicated on telescoping 
and microscoping physical aesthetics aﬀect all  
of the above—from epidermal media, to synthetic 
biology, to robotics, to what we used to call merely 
“industrial design”?
•Additive manufacturing, digital fabrication, 4D 
printing, etc. are then only the most apparent 
ways in which algorithms re-inaugurate the 
composability of matter for Design. As it scales 
to truly global networked fabrication, Design may 
engage a wholesale remapping of supply-chains, 
¹¹ See my “The 
Matter of/with Skin,” 
Volume 46: Shelter 
(December 2015).   
¹² See “Machine 
Vision: Benjamin 
Bratton in 
conversation with 
Mike Pepi and 
Marvin Jordan,” DIS 
Magazine [http://
dismagazine.com/
discussion/73272/
benjamin-bratton-
machine-vision/ 
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and with them the planetary-scale social relations 
of material culture more generally.
These make possible (and demand) 
reformulations of the media and institutions (and 
spatial and temporal conventions) of how we 
design, designate and enforce decisions. The 
quality and scope of political sovereignty is put 
into play, newly drawn jurisdictional borders are 
activated, and the polyphony of gender and/or 
sexual biotechnologies give wider range to the 
“expression of emotion in man(sic) and animals.” 
The sluggish churn of autochthonous traditions 
may be forced to increase pace; modular 
platforms of everyday urbanism are made 
more extensible (at least as rational as those 
of the International Space Station). We index 
the geologic cannibalism of life-as-we-know-it, 
from plankton blooms to peak oil, and leverage 
it toward post-Natural food infrastructures. 
Finally —hopefully— the cognitive crises of 
globalization(s) (fundamentalisms, nativisms, 
financial idealisms, etc.) may be folded back on 
themselves such that something more worthy  
of the name “civilization” might emerge.  
And so on.
All that is (deep breath… exhale) not the job 
of any one program or project or discipline or 
Design Theory, but together these examples align 
the contexts in which Speculative Design projects 
project themselves into the foreseeable future. 
They identify some of the basic media for Art and 
Design for the next decade, and in order to find 
out what they are good for, we need hundreds 
(thousands) of graduates testing what the  
new materials can teach us.¹³ The problems are 
already present, which should underscore why 
SD—versus a mode of Design that would optimize 
the status quo, or forms of Critical Design that 
talk themselves out of making enforceable 
normative claims—is the most feasible way out 
and way forward. Again, the ultimate value of the 
new material palette is not (only) in the things we 
can make with it, but in how it allows/forces us to 
re-adjudicate fundamental questions about who 
we are, what we are, where we are, when we are: 
how we are.
The Project, The Model
The work of Design takes shape in the formulation 
of the project, a unique rhetorical platform, and 
through the model, which may describe, idealize 
or activate the claims of a project. What may give 
¹³ This is the challenge 
and opportunity 
of the Speculative 
Design program at 
the industrial scale 
of a public research 
university such as 
University of California, 
San Diego. In the  
formulation of a design 
practice around an 
expertise in the Modern 
and/or new material 
palettes, I counsel 
students that it is  
not a matter of 
choosing one 
versus the other, 
but rather to “pick 
3 and prosper” 
(interaction design, 
synthetic biology, 
and robotics, for 
example).  
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SD some special traction is how it constructs 
the deliberate (and deliberative) ambivalent 
provisionality between the model and the project. 
There are more than a few ways it can do this, and 
I outline some below.
A project is, as the word suggests, a 
projection of a potential intervention into a 
situation defined by a certain spatial and temporal 
range. The project draws on a model  
of the situation (such as an analytical simulation) 
and may also result in a model of proposed 
intervention (such as an architect’s model of 
the built form). Exactly how a model serves as a 
descriptive or prescriptive simulation may already 
determine how the project will frame the spatial 
or temporal terms of its eventual intervention. 
That is, the project will argue that its breadth of 
intervention corresponds in some precise way to 
the breadth of that in which it intervenes. 
We may have descriptive models, such as 
diagrams that summarize complex events and 
relations into synthetic images, foregrounding 
the most relevant patterns, we hope. Or instead 
of those retroactive models, we may instead 
have realtime simulations of those events and 
processes that provide an indexical dashboard 
of their status. Or we may have instrumental 
diagrams that not only model those events 
and relations, but which when manipulated by 
a designer or user, also directly aﬀect them. 
Graphical user interfaces are an example of this 
sort of model. Indeed, the history of Design is 
not only one in which new technologies allow 
for new forms to be made, but one in which new 
technologies allow for new kinds of models about 
what a project can possibly project. These include 
algorithmic means for automating live models of 
patterns we could not otherwise deduce.
The modern era of Design innovated models 
not only for understanding systems but also for 
understanding the users of those systems. From 
the ancestral Vitruvian Man to Henry Dreyfuss’s 
Joe and Josephine, millions of use-case personas 
have stood in for larger consumer publics in the 
standardized specification of design solutions. 
Beyond ergonomic requirements, Cognitive 
Science-influenced Design research reconstructs 
the mental models with which users understand 
and interact with complex designed systems. 
Among the epistemological and methodological 
complexities of Design models is how easily 
one kind of model (descriptive, diagrammatic, 
diagnostic, normative) can be transposed into 
the purposes of another (projective, instrumental, 
managerial, aspirational). This is no less true 
for data-driven Economic models than it is for 
concept-driven Speculative models, though the 
latter may have a more resilient tolerance for the 
ambiguities that those shifts introduce.¹⁴
In relation to such complexities of Design 
models (and of our models of those models), the 
agency of the project within SD, and especially 
within SD education, deserves careful attention, 
and so the remainder of my remarks will hopefully 
provide some useful points for further debate.
1. The Prototype and the Prefigurative: Bruce 
Sterling’s working definition of “Design Fiction” 
as “the deliberate use of diegetic prototypes 
to suspend disbelief about change” remains 
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serviceable for SD, 
but is also (true to his 
point) an incomplete 
assignment. What 
comes after the 
suspension, and what 
homology is there 
between the prototype 
and the change?  It 
may be that the less 
certain the link the 
better the insight. The 
impetus to provoke 
disenchantment of 
the commonsensical 
is well-advised. But 
at the same time, we 
should be cautious 
that Design in this vein 
does not lapse into the 
merely “prefigurative,” 
whereby its purpose is 
to oﬀer-up fetishistic 
idealizations of some community-to-come, and for 
which the purification of means pre-occupies and 
delays the enforcement of its ends.¹⁵ Diﬀerent SD 
practices have diverse relations to “the real,” and 
to enchantment or disenchantment as strategies, 
but across the spectrum there is an allegiance 
to keeping the correspondence between the 
prototype and the outcome, the cause and eﬀect, 
an open and winding path—not a straight line.
2. Prometheus is Late for an Appointment with 
the Killer Apes: The material palette/ emerging 
¹⁵ Nick Srnicek 
and Alex Williams 
develop a more 
detailed analysis of 
the consequences 
of this tendency in 
Leftist politics in 
Inventing the Future: 
Postcapitalism and 
a World Without 
Work (London: 
Verso Press, 2015). 
Further, we might 
also observe that 
the ineffectuality of 
means-fetishization, 
including a moral 
observance of 
resistance and 
refusal as the 
basis of identity 
or position, is 
sometimes taken 
as an end in 
and of itself. In 
many “socially-
engaged” Art and 
Design practices, 
the prefiguration 
of ideal social 
forms may be an 
explicit goal, not 
the more difficult 
realization of them. 
To the extent that 
¹⁴ Scott Klemmer, 
my colleague at UC 
San Diego, made 
the point to me 
that perhaps the 
fulcrum of difference 
between speculative 
and other modes of 
Design is a tolerance 
and appreciation 
of ambiguity. He 
is right. Whereas 
some modes of 
Design seek to 
eliminate ambiguity 
from a process or 
user experience, 
speculative design 
(like Art) cultivates 
ambiguity as a 
method, an outcome 
and even an ethics.  
prefigurative means 
continuously do 
not “work,” then 
their very emptiness 
takes an independent 
importance (and 
hence the predictable 
shifts from politics 
to political art 
to performative/
relational gesture). 
As the failures pile 
up, failure itself 
becomes both 
political-aesthetic 
imperative, as it 
may be perhaps for 
some mobilizations 
of the “Anti-Social 
Turn” in Queer 
Theory. See Judith 
Halberstam (now 
Jack Halberstam), 
The Queer Art of 
Failure (Durham, 
NC: Duke University 
Press, 2011). That 
is, at one end of 
the prefigurative 
spectrum, idealized 
symbolic gestures 
are rigorously policed 
in the name their 
presumed eventual 
utility. Their failure is 
78 79
O
n 
S
pe
cu
la
tiv
e 
D
es
ig
n
B
en
ja
m
in
 H
. B
ra
tt
on
technologies cited 
above are “emerging” 
faster than are our 
theoretical and 
conceptual frameworks 
can orient them and 
be oriented by them. 
While such anomie is 
probably par for the 
course, our challenges 
are not just with 
nanotechnology and 
financialized migration 
flows. It is also with 
simple things like 
sugar, for example, 
and how our hunter-
gatherer propensity 
for glucose, sucrose 
and fructose paired 
with sentimental 
neo-Creationist ideas 
about food, have 
built the chemical 
supply-chain of global 
cuisine as a diabetes 
megastructure. A cup 
of demystification 
beats a pound of 
remediation.
Our current 
thinking is what makes 
these technologies possible and is what prevents 
them from fully reaching their capacities for 
meaningful innovation.¹⁷ Accordingly, maximizing 
institutional investment 
in engineering capacity 
while minimizing 
investment in the 
conceptual and critical 
capacity that would 
sustain implementation 
is an irrational policy. 
Universities take 
heed: the eﬃcient, 
illuminated path is to 
balance means and 
vision. Sustained and 
diverse investment 
in conceptually-
courageous, culturally-
informed, norm-making 
Design, Art and 
Humanities is necessary to realize the social 
value of investments in emerging technology. 
That said, it is also true that sometimes 
romantic and reactionary posturing (and general 
technical ignorance) in some such discourses/ 
departments (present company excluded of 
course!) makes correction more diﬃcult than it 
should be.
3. Discovery over Optimization: As said, for 
Design practice emerging technologies allow 
for the remaking of the world at a more granular 
level, and, for Design theory they may demystify 
and disclose something about our world and 
our species (and others) within it. That is, our 
contemplation and configuration of possible 
uses not only provides new means to do what 
¹⁶ Alexander Graham 
Bell’s space frame 
kite becomes 
Buckminster 
Fuller’s geodesic 
dome becomes 
Archizoom’s No-Stop 
City becomes 
Global Crossing’s 
trans-Atlantic 
cabling becomes 
scatological, populist 
social media.
¹⁷ See again,  
“We Need to Talk 
About TED.”  
thought to be caused 
by contaminated 
means. At the 
other end, gestural 
means are to be 
cultivated because 
of their recognized 
and celebrated 
uselessness, in the 
service perhaps of 
identity- or position-
making or unmaking. 
Hopefully my point 
about means-end 
relationships in 
creative practices is 
precisely calibrated. 
There are clearly 
many dependencies 
between Speculative 
Design and 
the conceptual 
apparatus of Queer 
social and anti-social 
technologies, for 
example, that are 
proven, possible, 
available and 
essential. I see no 
viable SD that is not 
guided by them.
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we already understand must be done, but may 
also de-authorize secular superstitions about 
who should do what with whom. That can mean 
diﬀerent things to diﬀerent people, and so much 
the better.
4. Stem Cell as Pharmakon: Any suﬃciently 
powerful/ eﬃcacious technology is simultaneously 
both good and bad (not or: and). So, pick 
your metaphor, Greek or germline. Emerging 
technologies are Pharmakoi: they are remedies 
and poisons. Any plan for them, or commentary 
on them, that evangelizes their positive or 
negative potential without articulating the inverse 
is incomplete and/or dishonest. Or if you like, 
emerging technologies are like stem cells; they 
could become this or they could become that, and 
which it will be is undecided but still decidable. 
Again, it is unwise to announce that their early 
manifestations (good or bad) represent their 
essential character and potential. We simply 
don’t know what they are good for yet, and so the 
search space of possibilities must be kept open 
for as long as possible (see above on balanced 
investment in means and conceptualization).
5. Art/ Design Can do Things that Science Can’t 
and/or is Not Allowed to Do: Even in the same 
research institution, sometimes the research that 
an Artist or Designer conducts may be essentially 
the same as what a Scientist may attempt, but 
one experiment can happen and the other cannot. 
The disciplinary permissions are diﬀerent, and so 
the arbitrage of leeway is a space for ideation and 
discovery.¹⁸ 
Examples from 
the 1990’s heyday 
Bio-Art are plentiful, 
but also consider the 
2002 re-staging of 
Milgram’s Obedience to 
Authority Experiment 
by Rod Dickinson in 
Glasgow’s CCA Gallery, 
and the likelihood 
that any Human Test 
Subjects research 
review committee 
would approve new 
follow-on studies 
by the Psychology 
faculty. Recently, I 
heard Jacob Applebaum discussing the Autonomy 
Cube, a collaboration with Trevor Paglen, and its 
installation in various Art galleries and museums, 
where this Tor meta-object, anonymizing invisible 
data packets in our immediate midst, drew the 
scorn of local security oﬃcials who were helpless 
to interfere. Outside the gallery, the device may 
have been confiscated or otherwise intercepted, 
but inside the gallery—where mimesis takes 
precedence—the sculpture is granted a kind of 
asylum and immunity from prosecution. Karolina 
Sobecka builds cloud-making and –tracking 
machines, collaborating informally and unoﬃcially 
with climate researchers at Scripps Institute of 
Oceanography here at U.C. San Diego. There are 
now both hard and soft moratoria on experimental 
geoengineering research by scientists, but her 
projects are possible if conducted as “only” Art. 
¹⁸ That is, the 
seam between 
Art and Design is 
one that not only 
re-operationalizes 
“who matters” 
and “what speaks” 
(Ranciere) or 
how the fleeting 
contemporary 
“event” is put in place 
(Groys) but also 
what matters, what 
is matter, when is 
this and what does it 
want from us?  
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SD is a zone where the tactical exceptions to 
norms can be granted and where, thereby, new 
norms are prototyped with some impunity.
6. The Best Worst/ Worst Best Thing You Can 
Think Of: For students, particularly younger 
and inexperienced students, the conventions of 
mainstream Design culture are sometimes an 
obstacle to the formulation of original research  
and a provocative project. Unworkable pitches  
for TechCrunch (“It’s Tinder meets AirBnB for 
Oculus Rift”) or an idealistic non-profit (“biofuel- 
powered hackathons for mindfulness”) are the 
default idioms.
I counsel students that their projects 
should span two balances. For the first, we are 
uncertain whether the project is “real” (did it 
happen, is it really being proposed to happen, are 
these prototypes functional, are those images 
composites, etc.?) It may be known to us, the 
viewers/respondents/users of the work, that this 
uncertainty is deliberate and that our interpretation 
depends on thinking it 
through. Ideally, if as we 
examine the work more 
carefully we are even 
less sure how “real” the 
work is (even less sure 
of the designer’s own 
intentions), then it is 
possible that instructive 
fault-lines between 
common sense and 
emergent reason are  
at work.¹⁹
The second balance to be pursued is not 
ontological, but ethical and programmatic. If we 
are startled by the strength of the design proposal, 
and are sure that should this project be realized 
it would have dramatic significance, but are also 
unsure whether doing so would be the best thing 
or the worst thing in the world (and more unsure 
the more we consider the project), then it is likely 
that there are original and serious insights be 
gleaned from the research. Ambiguity, abstraction 
and ambivalence are signals of successful Design 
Research, and the best SD projects position 
us between pro and con interpretations: is this 
ethical and/or unethical, is this remedy or poison? 
If we already know it would be one or the other, 
then the project may not suggest an interesting 
direction for ongoing experimentation. We know 
the outcome in advance. 
This is not to say that Design practice as a 
whole should not solve clear problems in clever 
ways (we are thankful for usable tools and 
interfaces that match doxic mental models and 
for the eﬀects of scale that they provide), but the 
SD research program has a specific interest and 
allegiance to ambiguity, not just as a means but 
as an end in and of itself.
7. 10,000 Year Site Conditions: Among my 
favorite well-known SD briefs was one written by 
the United States Department of Energy’s Oﬃce 
of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management’s 
Yucca Mountain Project (YMP). Proposals were 
solicited for a signage system that would warn-
oﬀ curious future excavations from accidentally 
unearthing radioactive nuclear waste to be buried 
¹⁹ This would 
differentiate the 
prototypical methods 
of Speculative 
Design (as here 
defined) from 
the “hoaxes” of, 
for example, The 
Yes Men, and the 
tendency to degrade 
into hidden camera 
dick jokes.   
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there in the desert. “Engineers, archaeologists, 
anthropologists, and linguists [were convened] 
to design eﬀective warning structures capable of 
lasting 10,000 years … Using archeological sites 
as ‘historical analogues.’” ²⁰ 
The brief is 
interesting for how 
it simultaneously 
demands both open 
speculation as to who/
what would be reading 
the proposed semiotics 
and for how strongly 
the answers must be 
tethered to the very real dangers. The temporal 
scale of the proposed intervention (over 130 
average human generations) is what commands 
super-speculative hyper-utilitarianism. It invites 
proposals that are genuinely uncanny because 
they are absolutely functional. The imaginative is 
thus enabled by the imperative; it is what allows 
the creative agent to step outside his/herself. 
I believe that we would be better served 
by similar briefs for other design problems. 
If we were to use 10,000 years to situate 
the successful design of other important 
domains (multigenerational housing, sovereign 
geographies, gender hacks, human-artificial 
intelligence interaction, transnational urbanism, 
egalitarian synthetic biology, or interspecies 
communication, etc.), I am confident that the 
design solutions (for us to grow into over time) 
would be both more imaginative and more 
functional than those prepared for yearly, decadal 
or average human organism lifespan durations.
Thus considering our interest in developing 
pedagogies that impart a more accurate 
understanding of where and when we are—based, 
one hopes, on geological time and astrophysical 
place—a pedagogy of “long circuits” would not 
just be one in which the speed of information 
technology is slowed to the pace of phenomenal 
contemplation (per Bernard Stiegler) but rather 
one in which technical 
contemplation-
composition is 
extended to the actual 
duration of its chemical 
and ecological 
reverberations.²¹
To conclude: What is 
called “human-centered 
design” (sometimes 
interchangeable 
with “user-centered 
design”) is not only 
not the solution, it 
is quite often the 
problem. Insofar they 
both de-center and 
de-privilege the human 
within their scenarios, 
there are points of 
alignment between 
the impulses of SD (as 
I’ve described it) and 
some of the formulas of Speculative Realism 
(but not others).²² The interest, to be clear, is 
not to eliminate (or to claim to eliminate) human 
²¹ On Stiegler, 
pedagogy and 
long circuits, 
see, for example, 
Bernard Stiegler 
and Irit Rogoff, 
“Transindividuation,” 
e-flux journal 14. 
(March 2010). 
²² That Speculative 
Realism would 
disenchant 
and demystify 
anthropocentric 
positions, yes; that it 
would provide cover 
for Spiritualism and 
political identities 
credentialized by 
fabricated, atavistic 
pre-Modernisms, no. 
²⁰ On the work of The 
Human Interference 
Task Force, see 
[https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Human_
Interference_Task_
Force]. 
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sentience, sapience and aﬀect from these rich 
dramas, but to conceptualize the world and 
to compose with it according to  models that 
locate human specificity in a more deliberately 
dispassionate position. The designable 
transformation of our position then becomes 
more accessible.²³ 
That is, one lesson 
we should take from 
the Anthropocenic 
predicament is that 
Anthropocentrism—
that the world is 
notionally here for 
us—finds justification 
in forms of Humanism for which the human 
experience of human experience (of the world or 
of just itself) oﬀers more profound truths than 
a materialism for which we are but one (albeit 
lovely) genre of sentient matter.
Recently, I spoke with a colleague in the 
Art world involved in an ongoing collaborative 
project on ‘theorizing the Anthropocene’ and 
was a bit alarmed by how much the inverse 
conclusion was taken for granted. In short, he 
repeated to me the thesis, as if obvious, that the 
root causes of this ethical-ecological malaise 
are opaque, mystical planetary hyperobjects and 
withdrawn, conspiratorial hyperprocesses, and 
therefore the work of political Art and Design 
is to re-render these sprawling systems at a 
phenomenologically-intuitive human scale.²⁴ The 
imperative, he said, is not only so that people can 
understand them in regular terms but so that their 
abominably inhuman scope can be reformed: we 
²⁴ The figure of “the 
Anthropocene” has 
also invited familiar 
misapprehensions, 
including facile 
condemnations 
of “the scientific 
materialist worldview” 
as a postlapserian 
algorithm of 
domination. It has 
sometimes given 
cause to cryptic 
superstition with 
new totems (i.e. 
decontextualized 
pictures of 
Andamanese islanders 
juxtaposed with 
can “heal” the Anthropocenic predicament by 
de-scaling its unnatural complexities back to a 
graspable, proximate organic norm. 
This approach is, I argue, symmetrically 
opposite of what is to be done. With briefs like the 
Yucca Mountain signage in mind, we appreciate 
that if SD can help to outline uncannily practical 
paths out of the Anthropocene, it is not because 
vast, impersonal temporal and spatial scales of 
global systems are brought to heel and drawn 
down to intuitive neurological and emotional 
comfort-zones. To think and design in other 
ways and at other scales is not only theoretically 
more defensible; it is now a practical necessity. 
²³ See Reza 
Negarestani, “The 
Labor of the 
Inhuman, pt. 1,” 
e-flux journal 52 
(Februray 2014).  
piles of lithium 
mining waste, 
etc.). Certainly 
Philosophy’s 
touch-points with 
Art are also not 
immune to similar 
mystifications. See 
for example, Timothy 
Morton, “Charisma 
and Causality: 
What if art were 
a kind of magic?” 
[http://artreview.
com/features/
november_2015_
feature_timothy_
morton_charisma_
causality/].
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Strategies for  
Future We’s
—Laboria Cuboniks 
in Conversation with  
Armen Avanessian
and Suhail Malik
The weaving of long circuits should head in the 
opposite direction: Design scaled to the scope 
of the real, not reality downsampled toward the 
digestible.
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Laboria Cuboniks (b. 2014) is a polymorphous 
xenofeminist collective comprised of 6 women 
across 5 countries, working in collaboration online 
to redefine a feminism adequate to the twenty- 
first century. They published Xenofeminism, A 
Politics for Alienation online in the spring of 2015 
and are currently working on a book that will 
elaborate on this text.¹
As an anagram of the 
“Nicolas Bourbaki” 
group of twentieth 
century French 
mathematicians, 
Cuboniks also advances an aﬃrmation of 
abstraction as an epistopolitical necessity for 
twenty-first century claims on equality. Espousing 
reason and vigorous anti-naturalism, she seeks to 
dismantle gender implicitly. Cuboniks is a multi-
taloned, tetra-headed creature uncomfortably 
navigating the fields of art, design, architecture, 
archeology, philosophy, techno-feminism, 
sexuality studies, digital music, translation, 
writing and regular experiments with the use of 
evolutionary algorithms in oﬀensive cybersecurity.
Armen Avanessian and Suhail Malik
The initial formulation of your political program 
was made in the form of a manifesto, a genre that 
proposes a transformative relation between the 
present as it has been historically constructed 
and, on the other hand, a future spelt out in that 
manifesto and (in your case) endorsed by it.  
Why was a manifesto form required to articulate 
your demands? 
¹ Laboria Cuboniks, 
[http://www.
laboriacuboniks.
net/].
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LC-HH 
What the manifesto form oﬀered was a prompt 
to formulate xenofeminism (XF) with concision; 
to distill the key foci of our shared endeavor in as 
condensed and powerful a way as possible. As a 
form, the manifesto also encourages a libidinized 
and aﬀective engagement with theoretical and 
political projects—it is a form that wants you to 
say, “I want.”
LC-PR 
Beyond the aﬀective aﬀordances endemic to 
the manifesto form, it is particularly useful in 
instigating viral uptake via online readership. 
Paragraphs are short and can be easily tweeted/
shared. This formal quality was equally in mind 
when finding a way to coalesce our six, often 
divergent, voices.  
AA-SM 
The XF manifesto emphasizes and endorses 
several “minor” practices (in the positive 
DeleuzoGuattarian sense) as present resources 
to support the speculative construction you 
envisage. Why does the manifesto mainly limit 
itself to these contemporary minor praxes for 
its models of xenofeminist platforms, several of 
which could be readily identified as progressively 
libertarian tactics?
 
LC-LF 
A politics that limits itself to lofty goals without 
trying to at least sketch out some local tactics 
is just utopianism, and one that sticks with 
local tactics alone is directionless. What you’re 
pointing to here seems to be the gap between our 
counter-hegemonic goals, as we state them there, 
and our preliminary, tactical suggestions, which 
seem to lean towards low-level or small-scale 
preparations. Of course there’s a gap! But what 
we’re really interested in is finding ways to bridge 
this gap—the zone of “mesopolitics,” as we put it 
in the manifesto. 
If our preliminary sketches seem libertarian, 
maybe this is because there’s not much in the 
manifesto that’s oriented towards petitioning the 
state, as it currently exists, to be the middleman, 
to be the agent that somehow lifts us up out of 
our current state and carries us on its shoulders 
to utopia. That said, the question regarding the 
role of the state is still one where you can find a 
good bit of divergence and tension within LC. I 
don’t think any of us are so incautiously optimistic 
as to put all of our eggs in that basket. We would 
rather experiment with, and develop, new forms 
of collectivization, and in this regard we might 
have something in common with some versions of 
libertarianism and anarchism, to the extent that 
they go beyond an often callous individualism and 
try to construct alternatives to the nation-state. 
The nation-state is not going to be what 
carries us out of capitalism, white suprematism 
and patriarchy. It can still be pressured and 
coaxed into making life marginally better for us 
all, but it tends to be so only insofar as it’s acting 
reactively—in response to forms of organization 
that strike oﬀ without it. (On a small scale: it was 
the existence of black-market and underground 
avenues to gender transition that pushed the 
medical establishment away from the old, sexist 
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gatekeeping protocols and towards informed 
consent, better medical coverage, and so on.) 
LC-DB 
There is divergence within the group, as LF said. 
The self-medication of hormone therapies is but 
one example, as is our tolerance (or lack of) for 
libertarian tendencies. I think the focus of XF work 
should not be on availability of healthcare on the 
black market. That can be a stopgap in desperate 
situations, but to speak of it as anything other 
than that is, I would say, a mistake. In many 
cases it helps cement poor healthcare options 
for already marginalized populations rather than 
working towards the systemic change necessary 
to better serve those populations. I don’t want 
healthcare choices to be relegated to second-
class DIY techniques when it comes to something 
so potentially life-altering. What I think XF should 
be working towards and espousing is a universal 
healthcare system that is free at the point of need 
in which things like safe transition and abortion, 
and other care that is currently restricted in some 
areas, would be available. I do concede that 
stopgaps may be needed in the interim in far too 
many cases. The Women on Waves initiative is  
an example of one of these needed stopgaps.  
What needs to be made clear and explicit, 
however, is that these interim-solutions are not  
to be understood as our solution for the long 
game (where should we be in 20, 100 or even  
200 years).
 
AA-SM
What distinctly futural pressures on 
contemporaneity does XF make? Could you 
amplify your advocacy of gender abolitionism 
in this regard? And what concept of the future 
do you subscribe to as an active ingredient for 
realizing your program? 
LC-LF 
All strategy is “futural.” There’s no way for it 
not to be. If there’s anything that makes us 
particularly “futuristic,” I suppose it comes 
down to two things: (1) we don’t think that any 
age of history oﬀers a model of feminism that 
we should uncritically imitate (and this includes 
the present—we don’t think the most urgent 
issue is to conserve what now exists), and (2) 
scale. Without losing focus on the world at our 
disposal, we think that feminist, anticolonial, 
and anticlass politics needs to think in terms of 
decades and centuries, rather than just in terms 
of relatively immediate gains. What kind of world, 
or worlds, do we want to see exist in 2116, for 
example? In 2226? What can we do over the next 
several decades to set those worlds in motion? 
If politics today tends to be anti-futuristic, it’s 
because it has such a dangerously strong bias 
in its time preference—it places the present, 
and the immediate future, above all else. Politics 
today is very smash-and-grab in nature, and this 
can be said of both the reigning parliamentary 
democracies (whose horizons are rarely more 
than an electoral term or two away) and protest 
politics (whose horizons rarely stretch beyond the 
event of the protest itself—a tendency that Nick 
Srnicek and Alex Williams dissect in “Inventing 
the Future”).² 
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LC-PR 
One of such futural 
pressures would be 
a remodeling of time 
itself—a model of 
time that undoes a 
linear sequencing. 
This is crucial for 
two key reasons: a) 
it can disentangle 
and diﬀerentiate us 
from Modernity’s 
“progressivism;” 
and b) it can help 
us understand 
and operationalize 
contemporary 
causation, since one 
cannot really strategize 
change without having 
some indication of  
how causality 
functions. In addition 
to your notion of the 
speculative time-complex, Diann Bauer’s art-
based research on time, and Elena Esposito’s 
reworking of time-binding in view of future 
risks, Marc Couroux’s work on time-modeling in 
hyperstition, what he calls chronoportation, is also 
instructive here. For Couroux, the bringing into 
reality of the future is akin to a mobilization  
of weak signals immanent in our given reality.³ 
AA-SM
What dissatisfactions/limitations with historical 
determinations of feminism does the concept of 
the future that you mobilize allow you to bypass, 
and how? 
LC-DB 
If you are asking after our concept of the future 
rather than our “ideas for” or “visions of” the 
future, that depends on how we understand time 
and the ability to have agency with regard to 
this thing called “the future.” This is a question 
of particular interest to me but I’m not sure 
that is the thing that allows us to bypass the 
dissatisfactions you mention. Yes, it might 
help construct the vision of the future and how 
to get there, but I think the question may be 
the wrong way around in that it is precisely the 
dissatisfactions and limitations of historical 
feminism that have made developing the very 
concept of “the future” as a feminist project  
so necessary. 
What are these limitations and 
dissatisfactions? One is certainly that we still have 
to talk about gender! The future we advocate is a 
post-gender one. I don’t want to be relegated to 
conversations about the body because of the body 
I’m in. XF is a concept that should function as a 
means to do away with its own need to exist. 
But, given the long term nature of the project, 
and the distance of the future in question, we 
need to start thinking of what to start doing in the 
meantime. XF aims in part to expand what can be 
conceived of as a feminist practice, broadening 
the limits of what feminist discourse is and the 
breadth of where it can function, and be accepted 
as a norm. 
² Nick Srnicek 
and Alex Williams, 
Inventing the Future: 
Folk Politics and 
the Left (New York: 
Verso, 2015).
³ See Elena Esposito, 
The Future of 
Futures: The Time of 
Money in Financing 
and Society 
(Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2011); 
Marc Couroux, 
“Anachronic 
Annexation,” in The 
Occulture, posted 
July 16 2014 [https://
www.academia.
edu/11262060/
Anachronic_
Annexation].
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The reason working in a wide range of fields 
needs to be a feminism and not just seen as 
getting on with other things, comes from the 
recognition that power relations across most 
fields are by no means equal. Opportunities, 
authority, access are all weighted by gender and 
we recognize that if the discourse about gender 
inequality is present only in fields that specifically 
aﬀect women disproportionally (fields that in 
many cases are already marginalized for that 
reason), it means that the idea of feminism itself 
is thus ghettoized. It needs to be broadened—not 
sequestered as a discourse.
This would liberate feminists to take on all 
spheres that are necessary for the construction  
of the post-contemporary without having to justify 
that intervention by referencing a historically and 
geographically specific form of feminist thought 
and practice.
AA-SM
Is the speculative construction of the present 
towards a programmatically organized future  
a modernist task? 
LC-DB 
Yes, it probably is to some extent. But XF diﬀers 
from modernism in that we are not arguing for a 
single overarching program. As mentioned earlier, 
we recognize the ability of the future (or ideas/
projections of it) to contribute to how we act in the 
now to reform what that future might become in 
fact rather than as a projection.  
Our origins are probably rooted in modernism 
but we have the benefit of hindsight, the capacity 
to analyze it and revise it, taking what seems 
useful and leaving what has been destructive. 
(This is not to say that we necessarily have it all 
correct now: analysis and revision as ongoing 
processes is something that XF very much 
avows). XF proposes that the shift from the 
“knowing that” a problem exists to “knowing how” 
to deal with it will have to happen across a myriad 
of disciplines, corroding any systems that are 
entrenched in patriarchy in a myriad of ways.
I take the distinction between “knowing that” 
and “knowing how” from Gilbert Ryle via Keller 
Easterling’s book Extrastatecraft: the Power 
of Infrastructure Space, where she describes 
“knowing how” as dispositional, meaning that 
it is not a master plan or a grand narrative but, 
as Easterling says, an assessment of “how 
organization deals with variables over time.”⁴ 
Individual actions in 
and of themselves will 
not be suﬃcient to deal 
with the problems we 
face but if a disposition 
can be developed and 
manipulated, then 
that can redress the 
balance, making things that we would endorse 
more likely, and things we would not less likely. 
This may be a more eﬀective way of operating 
politically, though it is a long game, which brings 
us back to questions of temporality. This is why 
the “knowing that” is equally as important as the 
“knowing how.” If we are to shape the disposition 
of things, one must have an understanding of their 
ontology, so that informed commitments  
⁴ Keller Easterling, 
Extrastatecraft:The 
Power of 
Infrastructure Space 
(London, New York: 
Verso, 2014), 81-83.
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can be made over time. It is through the dynamics 
of “knowing that” that we understand what is and 
define what ought to be. 
Change cannot be adopted from an 
overarching program; actions will have to be 
context-specific and heuristic. XF is an example 
of this. It is at the moment primarily a discursive 
and/or artistic practice; this is where our primary 
interventions lie, with the ambition that this work 
will have eﬀects on what thought and feminist 
practice shape up to be, and in turn how people 
act in the world. If, at the very least, XF is a 
catalyst that contributes to fields beyond itself, 
instigating shifts or, as Buckminster Fuller  
would have it, acting as a trim-tab, than that  
itself would be something.
AA-SM
How do you locate postmodernity—in particular, 
in what sense is xenofeminism distinct to  
the identity politics typical of contemporary 
critique’s postmodern configuration? How is XF  
a decisive intervention in such formations  
of contemporary politics?
LC-PR 
The nexus between postmodernism and 
particularism has led us to an awareness of 
positions often excluded or marginalized from 
given historical narratives, yet the end-logic  
of such an approach is deeply problematic  
for us insofar as it seems to highlight the 
recognition of diﬀerence as a victory unto itself. 
Meanwhile a hegemon throttles along, perhaps 
more “tolerant,” but structurally unchanged. 
When attempting to think a scalable politics 
at a counterhegemonic proportion, we need to 
find ways of constructing new “we’s”—in part, 
deploying some of postmodernity’s strengths, but 
putting more emphasis on engineering a “glue” 
between identities, without subsuming diﬀerence 
into a uniform template. It seems helpful to 
me in this regard to think of postmodernism’s 
focus on particularisms and/or diﬀerence (as 
an end-game) via Gilles Châtelet’s question: 
“Can one extract a part from the whole without 
leaving scars?”⁵ We can accordingly frame 
postmodernism’s 
weakness as what I 
would call a geometric 
omission—where, 
in putting all the 
emphasis on the 
“parts,” you presume 
that you can properly 
describe something as 
if it is separate from 
field conditions. The 
geometrical corrector 
lies in a capacity for conceptualizing the field, 
allowing us to address things more realistically,  
in their local to global relations—a global that 
is not simply “there” or given, but must be 
engineered. This move allows us to begin figuring 
the possibility for a non-absolute universal— 
a construction that binds solidarities without 
squashing particular diﬀerences.
AA-SM
Which other speculative formations—or 
⁵ Gilles Châtelet, 
Figuring Space: 
Philosophy, 
Mathematics and 
Physics, trans. 
Robert Shore 
and Muriel Zagha 
(Dordrech: Kluwer 
Academic Publishing, 
2000), 18.
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constructions of the 
post-contemporary—
do you see as having 
merit? What of their 
formative mobilization 
of the future—and of 
the configuration of the 
present by the future— 
is particularly 
instructive for you? 
 
LC-DB 
As mentioned earlier, 
the “speculative time- 
complex” (STC) and 
hyperstition are each 
alluring and interesting 
for us. However, I have 
many reservations 
regarding hyperstition 
in particular because, 
as I see it, it mystifies 
the labor of thinking, 
rationality and 
construction of 
a future. That is, 
hyperstition often 
remains in a quasi-
theological realm rather 
than providing an understanding of the reality 
of time slipping “out of joint.” By contrast, one 
only has to look to the sciences for many rational 
determinations of very odd and counterintuitive 
operations of time, how it exists— or doesn’t—
outside of human experience.⁶ But for all of the 
paradoxes to be found when looking at the reality 
of time in depth, there is also the substantial 
prejudice that the human experience of time 
exerts on our understanding of it, which limits the 
extent to which we (as finite biological systems) 
can comprehend time, as a unit of measure, as 
abstraction, or even as infinite looping structure 
with Lovecraftian creatures lurking just outside 
of perception. My hunch is that the development 
of the posthuman may enable jumps in 
understanding of time both as a unit of measure  
in the universe and as experienced by our  
hybrid progeny.
The risk of hyperstition is that it is merely 
another distraction from understanding the 
very real paradoxes and counter-experiential 
paradoxes in the nature of time. It is in any case 
a distraction from the possibilities of human 
agency to change what the future is by design. 
Furthermore, to return to the evidence physics 
presents about the reality of time, there can be 
no retrocausality coming from a real future into a 
now. There may be statements about the future 
that can have real eﬀects in the now even if they 
refer to nothing presently real. In derivatives 
markets, for example, the agreement to buy or sell 
an asset in the future at a certain price (thereby 
determining a future price of the thing itself) 
aﬀects how that thing is in fact traded today.⁷ 
Though this statement about the projected 
future has a reality because of the agreements 
made in the present (by people or algorithms), 
this (hyperstitional?) transformation is not 
retrocausality. It is rather power, authority, and 
⁶ Lee Smolin in his 
book Time Reborn 
(New York: Penguin, 
2013) goes through 
the history of 
twentieth century 
physics, laying out 
the arguments for 
the disappearance of 
time. He arrives back 
to the conclusion 
that the directionality 
of time is real with 
real consequences 
both for fundamental 
physics, for humans 
socio- 
politically and for 
Julian Barbour, who 
through the Wheeler-
DeWitt equation 
concludes that time 
(and motion) are 
illusions, part of a 
static universe.
⁷ Esposito, The 
Future of Futures.
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infrastructures saying something will be so, which 
in turn has eﬀects on how things play out in time.
AA-SM
Given that your claims and proposals extend 
well beyond the art field and also require 
commitments with futurities extending well 
beyond the time spans and practicable reach of 
the typically changing vagaries of contemporary 
art’s discursive fashions, how do you foresee the 
interest from art in your work being accelerated 
beyond its currently limited format? 
LC-PR 
Of course it’s highly unlikely that contemporary 
art will “change the world” in the concrete sense 
of rewriting economic policy, figuring out a 
solution against water contamination, rising 
seas, the refugee crisis, and so on. And there are 
many things to despise about the contemporary 
art world’s “novelty cannibalism” and the 
inconsistency between the claims it makes qua 
its actual functioning in the world, but it is also 
equally fashionable to make such complaints as 
a kind of “radical confession” of complicity whilst 
doing nothing about it. One finds similar problems 
within the academic world as well—especially in 
politically-oriented theory where one often has the 
impression that scholars are more concerned with 
their status and being “right” than actually seeing 
the world change. 
That said, rather than once again evoking 
the impotence of art, as an artist, I would rather 
try to think through the ramifications of these 
diagnoses and the ways in which thinking new 
forms of universalism, or an art-form fit for the 
age of complexity, ought to shape the demands 
we put on art—how it ought to function, and how 
those demands reformulate how we understand 
the artist to operate. Putting this emphasis on 
art’s functionality (which is itself a step away from 
the postmodern celebration of irrationality and 
non-function as a vector of emancipation from 
instrumentalized use-value) moves in the direction 
of what I would call a “nontrivial” art: an art the 
seeks to work in the service of these scalar  
concepts, and desires to be instrumentalized  
by them. 
What is at Stake  
in the Future?
—Alex Williams  
and Nick Srnicek
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Every ‘future’ inscribes a demand upon the 
present. This is so whether at the level of human 
imagination, or within the sphere of political or 
aesthetic action necessary to reach towards 
their realization. Futures make explicit the 
implicit contents of our own times, crystallizing 
trajectories, tendencies, projects, theories and 
contingencies. Moreover, futures map the absent 
within the present, the presents which could never 
come into actuality, the wreckage of dreams  
past and desires vanquished. Futures are 
speculative, libidinal, suggestive and, perhaps, 
ultimately unattainable. 
In our work to date, and in particular ‘The 
Accelerationist Manifesto’ and Inventing the 
Future, we have positioned a particular orientation 
towards the futural as a key condition of 
possibility for a revivified left politics. Only under 
conditioning from some concept of the future 
can a programmatic, systematic, and ultimately 
hegemonic new political tendency be born. The  
manifesto-form is, in some sense, the 
embodiment of this futural orientation. It brings 
with it a particular mode of address: it declares, it 
declaims, it demands, and all in relation to some 
incipient future that it hopes to will into existence. 
The form is, in some senses, generative of its 
contents. The seeming impossibility of certainty 
in today’s political world, and in particular on the 
political left, renders the manifesto a slightly 
curious mode of address: just who would stand 
as prophets and pronounce the new world 
just beyond reach? Yet to do so is a (painful) 
necessity not because of the certainty of this or 
any other future, but because of the certainty of 
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the persistence of the neoliberal alternative in the 
absence of attempts to move beyond the reactive 
and into the register of the prospective. More 
simply: we must begin to imagine alternatives 
to the present, however gauche, or risk the 
permanence of the trajectories of today.     
In this context, the programmatic demands 
which we set out in Inventing the Future— 
demands for full automation, universal basic 
income, a reduction in the working week, and the 
wholesale destruction of the work ethic—take on 
a double role. On the one hand, they can function 
as a heuristic fiction (what elsewhere is described 
as a ‘hyperstition’). In this sense, their relative 
truth value (or feasibility) is less relevant than 
their ability to break down existing prejudices, 
shibboleths and received wisdoms amongst the 
various silos and tranches of the political left. In 
posing these demands, a future orientation might 
emerge which, even were it not to fully realize 
these demands, would functionally transform 
the horizons of leftist politics. On the other hand, 
we have chosen to present these particular 
demands and the future they entail, a post-work 
world, because we think it both eminently feasible 
and decidedly coherent. It is feasible precisely 
because of the way it anticipates and bootstraps 
beyond existing material tendencies: towards the 
automation, taskification, and precarity of work, 
and against a context of the increasing generation 
of surplus populations, and the seeming inability 
of neoliberal societies to generate the innovation 
and profitability for which they are allegedly 
promoted. The problem of automation and 
taskification of labor, for example, is now widely 
noted and expected to utterly transform the 
world of work in both advanced and developing 
economies over the next two decades. The 
demands are also coherent, in the sense that each 
relates to how a tendency, whether present (as in 
automation) or past (as in demands for shortening 
the working week) can lock in and re-inforce the 
other. Make progress on one of these demands 
and the others will become more possible. In 
this sense, the future we point towards is a 
navigational concept—enabling the construction 
of a feasible and coherent future in a time of 
transformation and uncertainty. 
Such a navigational notion of a future is 
necessary if we are to move beyond the limitations 
of the political left of today. We lack the space to 
elaborate the full range of dissatisfactions with 
the range of leftist forces that took shape from the 
1980s to the 2000s. What we can certainly point 
towards, however, are the consequences of the 
left’s abandonment and evacuation of the territory 
of the future. First, this is at the level of plans, 
programs, and prospects. Here the left (or lefts) 
have relinquished the imaginative-libidinal terrain 
of the future. This can be identified across an 
entire range of diﬀerent left-political phenomena, 
from the collapse of European social democratic 
parties, to the over-valorization of critique 
in political academia, and in the widespread 
reactivity on the part of radical left campaigns and 
activists, always keener to prevent and protect 
against neoliberal incursions rather than propose 
and propound some viable alternatives. Second, 
however, is the more realist sense that the left’s 
capacity to determine (or influence) the course of 
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the future has also declined. In practical terms, 
the prospects since the 1990s of a left capable 
of altering the direction of travel of large social, 
political, economic, and technical systems have 
been drastically reduced. In this sense, ‘the 
future’ has been abandoned by the left not just 
because it lacks the desire to design it, but also 
because of its declining hegemony, its relative 
weakness in the balance of forces. These two 
sides are reciprocally linked to one another. Just 
as the decline in hegemonic power emaciates 
the imagination, so too does the desertion of the 
optics of the future limit in advance the prospects 
of practical political activity.  
Concurrent with these political development, 
the elaboration of speculative future narratives, 
and indeed, on some accounts, the future itself, 
was purported to have been banished with the 
advent of postmodernity. As Lyotard’s epochal 
definition puts it, we have grown suspicious of 
the metanarrative, and in its wake historical 
teleology and even grand-scaled meaning-making 
have collapsed into an impossible to summarize 
plurality of fractured, partially overlapping 
micro-events. There is of course some truth to 
these claims, yet as we argue, Lyotard moves 
too quickly to dismiss the mass belief in ‘the 
future’ and the big picture trajectory. What has 
disappeared is faith in the future in the more 
depressing sense of a better future, while looming 
dystopian perspectives, of a future of hyper-
neoliberalization, rising surplus populations, 
and environmental catastrophe have become 
all-too ubiquitous. Key political signifiers such as 
‘modernization,’ for example, have become almost 
entirely subsumed within a neoliberal framework. 
The modernization of an industry, workplace, or 
pursuit, today indicates privatization, contracting 
out, rising precarity and declining wages.
The task of elaborating futures, both within 
the sphere of ideas and the domain of action, 
might be deemed on such a basis a classically 
modernist one. This is a frame which we partially 
endorse. Modernism’s emphasis on the future, 
on the possibility of human accomplishments 
to determine a better future, is certainly not to 
be abandoned. Yet we must admit to seeking a 
more complex relationship between the future 
and politics than the teleological fairy tales of 
Hegelian Marxism. History has demonstrated 
that we are as likely to see reversals, swerves, 
and collapses, as a constructive building towards 
universal human flourishing. So too is the 
world more plural, less unitary, and ultimately 
more complex than certain modernist strands 
of thought would present it. As such, while we 
believe that the recovery of certain dimensions 
of the historical modernist project are essential 
facets of creating a new leftism, it simultaneously 
requires us to reach towards something like 
Fernando Zalamea’s transmodernism: a 
synthetic universalism, dynamic, plural, and 
revisable, yet capable of moments of partial 
universalization. Within such a perspective, the 
future or futures can operate as partial binding 
agents—motivating transitions, translations, 
and transplantations, creating momentary fixes 
and coherent trajectories within a broader flux. 
From another perspective futures here operate as 
complexly hegemonic operators—investing and 
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re-engineering pre-existing fields of ideology  
and organization. 
The book, Inventing the Future, should be 
understood in this way. It is an attempt to knit 
together a series of partial perspectives into 
a more universal and hegemonic project, an 
attempt to make a reasoned argument for why a 
post-work world is both necessary and possible 
at this moment, and an eﬀort to show how this 
intersects across a range of diﬀerent existing 
movements. To achieve this, the book functions 
diﬀerently from the aﬀective mobilization involved 
in the manifesto-form, but it is no less directly 
political. It is ultimately a call for a post-work 
politics to be built by all those who feel convinced 
by its proposals. As such, the book has self-
consciously moved away from the fashionable 
term ‘accelerationism’ and is an attempt to build 
a more long-standing political project. While 
‘accelerationism’ has been an inspirational, albeit 
often misunderstood, term to many, our interest is 
in much grander projects than the latest biennale.
Fractured Mediations
—Victoria Ivanova
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Once a poster image for the great promise of 
universal accountability, the human rights system 
is now perhaps most infamous for its institutional 
failures.¹ And yet, its most intriguing shortcomings 
are to be found in the 
ways it has failed to 
cohere with our times 
as a mediation regime 
rather than simply as 
a defunct juridico-
institutional  
project.² That is, 
human rights have 
lost their traction as a 
means of framing the 
world. International 
criminal law is no 
longer heralded as a 
triumph for humanity; 
politicians aren’t so 
quick to flash the 
human rights card when 
condemning violent acts 
of organized agents 
that aren’t part of 
their club; mainstream 
media rarely resort to 
framing concerns of 
universal significance in 
terms of human rights; 
traditional humanitarian 
aid work is now spoken in the language of data 
mining and smart interfaces.³ With complex 
interconnectivity increasingly becoming the 
lead image of universal dynamism, static and 
¹ See, for example, 
Rosa Freedman, 
Failing to Protect: 
The UN and the 
Politicisation of 
Human Rights, 
(London: Hurst 
Publishers, 2014); 
Eric A. Posner, 
The Twilight of 
Human Rights 
(Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 
2014); Stephen 
Hopgood, The 
Endtime of Human 
Rights (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University 
Press, 2015); 
Jean Bricmont, 
Humanitarian 
Imperialism: Using 
Human Rights to 
Sell War (New York: 
Monthly Review 
Press, 2007).
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highly normative 
anthropocentric 
reductions like 
Human Rights feel 
embarrassingly 
anachronistic. By the 
same token, a pedantic 
emphasis on juridical 
procedures comes 
at the expense of 
responding to changing 
environmental 
conditions, making the 
gap between code and 
reality ever wider.
The global 
contemporary art 
project, by contrast, 
has been growing from 
strength to strength 
in terms of its global 
reach, its market size⁴  
and its embeddedness 
into the socio-
institutional fabric 
of the transnational 
cosmopolitan 
community.⁵ 
Contemporary art’s 
post-structurally 
attuned soft diplomacy allows for a matching 
of needs and functions that straddle diverse 
stakeholders and beneficiaries: contemporary 
art institutions perform a pseudo-public or -civic 
function in contexts where these are either 
eroding or have never 
existed (in a socio-
democratic form); in 
exchange for much-
needed liquidity, High 
Net Worth Individuals 
and powerful corporate 
entities accrue cultural 
capital and public 
legitimacy while 
diversifying their 
portfolios. The content 
of contemporary art 
is branded as socially 
relevant insofar as it 
is largely predicated 
on critical responses 
to most current trends 
and developments in 
other fields, whether 
it’s technology, a new 
theoretical concept, 
a persisting form of 
oppression, or self- 
referential analysis.⁶ 
I’d like to put 
forward the argument  
that there exist 
important, and under-acknowledged, confluences 
between human rights and contemporary art as 
regimes of mediation, and that since the advent of 
neoliberalism’s global hegemony, contemporary 
art had eﬀectively taken over from human rights 
(HR) the function of mediating the liberal subject 
and cosmopolitan globality. At the surface, 
² I use the term 
“mediation regime”  
to identify the lenses 
through which truths 
are produced (in 
the Foucauldian 
sense of that 
word) at the level 
of social ecology 
by normalizing/
institutionalizing 
certain epistemo- 
political foundations, 
value systems and 
economic functions.
³ Mark Duﬃeld, “The 
Digital Development-
Security Nexus: 
Linking Cyber-
Humanitarianism 
and Drone Warfare,” 
in Paul Jackson 
(ed.), Handbook 
on International 
Security and 
Development 
(Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2015).
⁴ Georgina Adam, 
Big Bucks: The 
Explosion of the Art 
Market in the 21st 
Century (Surrey/
Burlington: Lund 
Humphries, 2014).
⁵ Mersha Meskimmon, 
Contemporary 
Art and The 
Cosmopolitan 
Imagination 
(London: Routledge, 
2010); Okwui 
Enwezor, “Intense 
Proximity: 
Concerning the 
Disappearance 
of Distance,” in 
Intense Proximity: 
An Anthology of the 
Near and the Far, 
La Triennale, Palais 
de Tokyo (Paris : 
Editions ArtLys, 
2012).
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this is evident in the 
notion of a timeless 
contemporary (or the 
forever now) manifest 
in contemporary art 
and so central to “the 
end of history” moment 
of the 1990s.⁷  As a 
regime of mediation, 
contemporary art (CA) 
proposes a perpetual 
semantic reorganization 
of the present via the 
subject’s immediate 
experience in a gesture 
to open up a multitude 
of symbolic futures that 
never deliver in actuality, 
thus de facto allowing 
for the re-entrenchment 
of existing power 
configurations. The 
splitting of the value 
of (critical) reflection 
from infrastructural 
ecology serves to ring-
fence transformation 
into a closed-loop realm of experience and fancy.⁸  
In turn, this shortchanges the act of enabling 
transformations for the consumption of  
symbolic potentialities—through sentimentality, 
lament and mystification—thereby taking us 
further and further away from understanding  
how to strategically operationalize actuality for 
concrete aims.
One of the 
main motivations 
for articulating this 
argument is to frame 
CA as a system of 
mediation that is 
imbricated in a larger 
project of global 
ordering rather than 
seeing it as a genre of art.⁹ In this sense, tracing 
the transition from HR to CA oﬀers an opportunity 
to highlight some crucial defining confluences 
between the two systems at the level of their 
originating ontologies and universal ambitions. 
The “transition” vicariously tells the story of 
conflicting liberal agendas complementing each 
other and competing for primacy: legalistic 
liberalism (or legalism) may have provided the 
necessary institutional-aspirational backdrop 
to the expansion of the global market, yet 
neoliberalism (or market liberalism) ultimately 
proved itself as a much stronger contender for 
lead status due to its relentless flexibility and 
relative immunity to internal contradictions.¹⁰ 
International Law: Between Imperialism  
and Emancipation
Historically, the European colonial project 
inaugurated international law as an ambitious 
universal undertaking that attempted to guide 
global expansion on the terms of the invaders 
in a systematic and “orderly” fashion.¹¹ Within 
⁶ Suhail Malik, 
“Forever Young,” 
in Art Review, 
January-Fenruary, 
2015 [available at 
http://artreview.
com/features/jan_
feb_2015_feature_
forever_young/].
⁷ Francis Fukuyama, 
The End of History 
and the Last Man 
(London: Penguin, 
2012).
⁸ See Victoria Ivanova, 
“Art’s Values: A 
Detenge, a Grand 
Plie,” in PARSE, 
Issue II, 2015 
[available at http://
www.parsejournal.
com/article/arts-
values-a-detente-a-
grand-plie/].
⁹ In contrast to, for 
example, Peter 
Osborne, Anywhere 
or Not at All: The 
Philosophy of 
Contemporary Art 
(London: Verso, 
2013). 
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the power circle of 
European states, 
international law 
reinforced the 
Westphalian agenda 
of national sovereignty 
and the desire to keep 
war as the mechanism 
of last resort for conflict 
resolution.¹² That 
international law was 
born out of imperialism 
and functioned as a tool 
of deterritorialization 
has always haunted its 
status as an inherently 
biased form of  
global governance.
The HR discourse 
emerged in the late-
nineteenth century with 
the understanding that 
national sovereignty 
may function as a 
deterrent of (European) 
inter-state war but it 
does not prevent the 
eruption of violence 
that may spill out from 
within the state as a result of internal politics. The 
experiences of Fascism and Soviet Communism 
in the 1930s and the Second World War served to 
weaken significantly the primacy of sovereignty 
in international law for its leading Western 
proponents.¹³ These powers instead used 
international law as a 
channel for instituting 
the international human 
rights regime, which 
saw the emergence of  
a new legal stakeholder: 
the universal human 
subject. The system 
of national ratification 
of international 
multilateral treaties 
and the possibility of 
instituting transnational 
bodies to monitor 
compliance through 
these legal instruments 
came straight out of 
existing international 
law precedent. 
However, the reach 
of the human rights 
treaties into the internal 
aﬀairs of nation-states 
together with the legal 
leveling of the human 
subject on a par with 
the nation-state marked 
a radical departure from 
the earlier image of the world as a “community”  
of nation-states governed by the principle of non-
intervention into individual domestic aﬀairs. 
The de jure inauguration of the universal 
human subject as a global abstract unit on a  
par with the state was a major milestone  
in the history of liberalism, and a key juncture  
¹⁰ Judith Shklar, 
Legalism: Law, 
Morals and Political 
Trials (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard 
University Press, 
1964); T. R. S. Allan, 
Constitutional 
Justice: A Liberal 
Theory of the Rule 
of Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University 
Press, 2004); 
Ludwig von Mises, 
Liberalism: The 
Classical Tradition, 
trans. R. Raico 
(London: Liberty 
Fund Inc, 2005 
[original German 
publication 1927]); 
Philip Mirowski 
and Dieter Plehwe 
(eds), The Road 
from Mount Pelerin 
(Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University 
Press, 2009).
¹¹ Antony Anghie, 
Imperialism, 
Sovereignty and 
the Making of 
International 
Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge 
University Press, 
2008).
¹² Carl Schmitt, The 
Nomos of the Earth, 
trans. G. L. Ulmen 
(New York: Telos 
Press, 2006 [original 
German publication: 
1950]).
¹³ Mortimer Sellers, 
The New World 
Order: Sovereignty, 
Human Rights 
and the Self-
Determination of 
Peoples (Oxford: 
Berg Publishers, 
1996).
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at which the legalistic 
tradition meets the  
market-driven 
one.¹⁴ In this sense, 
contemporary art 
regime’s ability to 
position a universal 
subject is to a large 
extent indebted 
to the legacy of 
the HR regime’s 
juridico-institutional 
legitimation of  
individual agency. 
Unsurprisingly,  
the attempts to make 
the international HR 
system work have been 
an upward struggle, 
thwarted by powerful 
states for the reason 
of breaching their national interest (notably, 
the United States) and weaker states for the 
reason of colonial meddling in their state-building 
(for example, states that decolonized in the 
1950s, 60s and 70s). To that extent, while the 
institution of the HR regime became the pinnacle 
of legalism’s achievements, its system was too 
rigid to reconcile its imperial history, its top-down 
power dynamics packaged with liberal policies 
aimed at deregulating national markets, and its 
proclaimed politico-ethical values—none of which 
have been able to keep apace with changing 
environmental conditions.¹⁵ 
Breaking the Mold
For the HR regime, the 
pivotal relationship that 
needs to be managed 
is the one between the 
state apparatus and 
the subject. The former 
is presumed to exert 
oppressive force in an 
established menu of 
violations (for example, 
denying the right 
to live, free speech, 
religious aﬃliation, 
right to assembly, 
and so on), while the 
subject is on the other 
hand presumed to be 
a vulnerable human 
suﬀering the brunt 
of Leviathan’s hand. The additional proviso of 
equating “the vulnerable human” with a legal 
subject in order to make the claims actionable 
means that the state that might be the oppressor 
needs to recognize the vulnerable human as a 
legal subject. This obviously poses a catch-22 
that was accurately characterized by Hannah 
Arendt in relation to the figure of the “refugee”: 
in order for the oppressed to benefit from human 
rights, the oppressor must acknowledge them as 
human.¹⁶ Meanwhile, the post-structuralist line 
of attack on the problem of equating the subject 
with specific legal categories is that it unleashes 
a violence of overdetermination that is in itself a 
¹⁴ Susan Marks, 
“Four Human Rights 
Myths,” in David 
Kinley et al. (eds), 
Human Rights: 
Old Problems, 
New Possibilities 
(Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2013); 
Naomi Klein, The 
Shock Doctrine: 
The Rise of Disaster 
Capitalism (London: 
Penguin, 2008); 
Samuel Moyn, The 
Last Utopia: Human 
Rights in History 
(Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University 
Press, 2012).
¹⁵ For one of the 
most incisive 
take-downs of the 
de-historicizing 
tendencies of human 
rights, see Mahmood 
Mamdani, When 
Victims Become 
Killers: Colonialism, 
Nativism, and the 
Genocide in Rwanda 
(Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 
2001).
¹⁶ Hannah Arendt, 
The Origins of 
Totalitarianism (New 
York City: Random 
House, 1973).
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form of oppression to 
be resisted.¹⁷  
In contrast to the 
forever faltering purism 
of the legal liberal 
tradition, market-driven 
liberalism is happy to 
change its protagonists, 
antagonists, 
allies and—most 
importantly—its ethico-
political principles 
however the situation 
demands. All so long 
as the baseline economic policies are in place. 
This paradigm on the one hand reverses the 
logic of legalistically-minded globalism, allowing 
for greater diﬀerentiation at the level of local 
governance and societal organization (including 
state oppression) and emphasizing the freedom 
of individual/culturally specific identifications, 
aﬃliations and belief systems unrestrained by 
deterministic top-down norms. On the other hand, 
market-driven liberalism nevertheless requires an 
ethico-juridical grounding for individual primacy 
and the concomitant private ownership claim that 
emerges from it. Their merger is pitched as the 
guarantor of outward heterogeneity that allows 
societies to reap the benefits of inclusion into the 
global system.
The contemporary art regime, understood as 
the totality of the field’s institutional ecology— 
importantly including “the market”—shares a 
lot of foundational principles with human rights 
in terms of situating the subject as the key unit 
of the modern global 
order. Their shared 
matrix—Kant’s moral 
subject—leads both to 
valorize individuation 
and problematize the 
individual’s relationship 
to the outside world, 
albeit approaching 
these questions from 
diﬀerent perspectives.¹⁸ 
On the latter front, 
the CA regime provides 
a much more open-
ended solution. As the 
ambiguity of the phrase 
implies, the subject may 
be understood both as 
the subject-matter of 
art and the subject that 
is somehow brought 
into view through the 
contemporary art 
paradigm. Without 
rehearsing arguments that have been made  
by others on this matter, the subject posited by  
CA’s institutional ecology is the cognitive- 
phenomenological subject who in their experience 
of art, co-constructs meaning and decides on 
its mode of operation in the world. The subject’s 
agency in structuring the world thus comes to the 
symbolic fore, while an emphasis on the unique 
stature of the one conjuring meaning allows for 
diﬀerence to become the defining characteristic 
of subjecthood.¹⁹ 
¹⁷ See, for example, 
Slavoj Zizek, 
“Against Human 
Rights,” in New 
Left Review 34, 
July-August 2005; 
Costas Douzinas, 
Human Rights 
and Empire: The 
Political Philosophy 
of Cosmopolitanism. 
(Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2007).
¹⁸ Immanuel Kant 
Critique of Pure 
Reason, ed. and 
trans. P. Guyer 
and A. W. Wood 
(Cambridge: 
Cambridge 
University Press 
1999 [original 
German publication: 
1781/1787]); 
Immanuel Kant, 
Groundwork of 
the Metaphysics 
of Morals, trans. 
M. Gregor and 
J. Timmermann 
(Cambridge: 
Cambridge 
University Press, 
2012 [original 
German publication: 
1785]).
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At the same time, 
the infinite mutability 
of CA’s subject-matter 
reflects the ever-
changing dynamics of 
the world at play. As I 
have argued elsewhere, 
CA’s ontological 
liberalism—that is, 
its lack of substantive 
criteria deflected by an 
emphasis on subjective 
contingencies—means 
that the operating 
status of being art is 
in practice delegated 
to CA’s insertion into 
a specific socio-
institutional ecology.²⁰ 
Content-wise, CA 
tends to be either 
preoccupied with its 
internal historical 
configurations or delves into other fields 
(“reality at large”), semantically reorganizing 
their premises along with its own, and funneling 
the newly constructed semantic constellations 
into artworks.²¹ Both approaches owe a fair 
share of their legitimacy to the fact that post-
structuralism and critical theory have played a 
major role in shaping CA’s language(s). At the 
core of the post-structuralist move is the turn 
towards deconstruction as a means of unpicking 
the suppressed premises that reveal obfuscated 
(power) dynamics. From this perspective, CA’s 
mediation of “reality at large” is ontologically 
rooted in deconstruction as a basic operation 
that may be supplemented by additional elements 
such as critique or mimetic enactment. 
Similarly, with regard to HR and codes of 
law, Jacques Derrida echoes concerns voiced 
earlier in this text around top-down norms that 
can never fully capture the nuance and complexity 
of a given subject or situation. In “Force of Law,” 
Derrida urges to resist formally equating law 
with justice.²² Acknowledging the pragmatic 
need for law, Derrida 
argues that in contrast 
to law’s calculating 
operations, justice is 
an aporetic experience 
that can only be 
rendered visible in the 
process and project 
of deconstruction. 
Derrida’s distinction 
between the 
concretizing tractability 
of law and the 
tumultuous fluidity of justice qua deconstruction 
resonates much more closely with CA than HR 
insofar as the former mediation regime opposes 
a stable system of referents and encourages an 
approach in which justice is seen as a perpetual 
process rather than a stable code. In a similar 
vein, the CA regime proves itself more capable 
of (semantically) dealing with diﬀerence, while 
its constant questioning of itself renders it 
capable of (semantically) responding to emerging 
conditions. Issues that burst the HR regime at its 
¹⁹ Suhail Malik, “The 
Politics of Neutrality: 
Constructing a 
Global Civility,” in 
Thomas Keenan 
and Tirdad Zolghadr 
(eds), The Human 
Snapshot (Berlin/
Annandale-on-
Hudson: Sternberg 
Press/CCS, 2013). 
²⁰ Ivanova, “Art’s 
Values: A Detenge,  
a Grand Plie.” 
²¹ Peter Osborne, 
Anywhere or Not at 
All: The Philosophy 
of Contemporary 
Art (London: Verso, 
2013). 
²² Jacques Derrida, 
“Force of Law: The 
‘Mystical Foundations 
of Authority,’” in 
Drucilla Cornell, 
Michel Rosenfeld & 
David Carlson (eds.), 
Deconstruction 
and the Possibility 
of Justice (London: 
Routledge, 1992).
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seams—such as the displaced centrality of the 
human figure, non-individual identities, machine 
intelligence, the environment, dispersed power/
oppression—make the CA regime thrive in its 
place as a mechanism of mediation that reasserts 
its contemporaneity by digesting novelty.  
From Subject to System 
CA’s agility in attending to contextual 
particularities is integrated with (and partially 
dependent on) an underlying presumption of 
a shared globality. This globality manifests 
itself in positing art as a universal abstraction 
that is locally-constituted and which addresses 
globally-distributed phenomenological 
subjects. Frequently interpreted as either 
an ideal companion of neoliberal de- and 
re-territorialization, or (for that very reason)  
an ideal tool for contending with neoliberalism,  
CA is most often either dismissed as a purely 
neoliberal project or prescribed with the 
Promethean task of eclipsing neoliberalism  
(and capitalism) altogether. 
The two responses may appear to be 
on the opposite sides of the spectrum, yet 
they both seem to emerge from an idealized 
understanding of art’s agency and misplaced 
expectations as far as the prowess of mediating 
systems is concerned. Just as it isn’t particularly 
surprising that the HR regime attempted to 
establish a stable universal subject alongside 
existing political and economic agendas, some 
of which were predatory and some benevolent, 
there is nothing controversial in the fact that 
the CA regime’s vision of a nuanced and locally 
diﬀerentiated subject in a world that is itself 
subject to persistent reformation is embroiled in 
a larger politico-economic landscape. In eﬀect, 
it’s the very purpose of regimes of mediation to 
be deployed for a variety of ends. Consequently, 
the ethico-political question of holding them 
accountable for instituting orders that we find 
unsatisfactory is diﬀerent to the question of 
whether a particular mediation regime rises to 
the challenges of its times. This means that 
instead of expecting any solution to arise from art 
(or its demise), it may be more pertinent to ask: 
does this regime have the structural capacity to 
function as a system for mediating future-oriented 
concerns? How does it stand up to the challenges 
facing us today?
While these challenges might not be so 
diﬀerent from the myriad of issues that CA is 
already contending with at the level of its content 
(for example, environmental disaster and its 
“negative externalities,” new synthetic life forms, 
increasingly intelligent machines, disenfranchised 
populations, and so on), the outstanding 
question is: what does this mediation achieve? It 
is certainly the case that artistic and curatorial 
investigations are providing inroads into these 
various issues from perspectives that diverge 
from and question those with actual jurisdictional 
control (such as financiers, politicians, tech-
preneurs, leading scientists, etc.). There is 
certainly merit in these inquiries and they are also 
largely supported by the CA’s institutional network 
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(curators, museums, galleries, collectors, etc.). 
The internal consensus of the CA field is perhaps 
not too dissimilar from that of the UN (or the 
human rights professional field), which sees the 
human rights system valuable as it is (despite its 
ever increasing limitations). 
However, just as the UN’s internal consensus 
has not been a guarantee of the regime’s 
relevance for mediating contemporary issues, 
there is a possibility that the CA regime 
may be facing a similar plight. The fact that 
CA’s ontological liberalism also extends to 
its epistemology—that is, in its method of 
structuring, synthesizing and organizing 
knowledge—tends to reproduce confounding 
open-endedness, while implicitly reproducing 
existing infrastructural realities. The former might 
have been an adequate strategy for mediating 
overdetermined meaning, but if one of the key 
questions emerging today is how to reconstitute 
meaning in order to forge a pathway out of the 
present, mediation must respond to the demands 
of a strategically-minded acumen, which is 
hard to achieve without a systemic and scalable 
epistemological foundation. By extension, CA’s 
phenomenological dimension stands in the way of 
dealing with abstraction and non-anthropocentric 
conceptions of space and time that are so 
crucial for thinking on a scale demanded by a 
reality, in which the impact of individual agency 
is negligible. Of course, one of the questions 
is whether the transition proposed here could 
happen within the CA regime, and whether such a 
regime would still be called contemporary art. 
There is also the much larger question of the 
need to surpass the liberal framework altogether. 
While this goal may be both desirable and realistic 
in the long haul, there is also a pragmatic need to 
work with the socio-material structures available 
to us today and to be capable of mobilizing 
liberalism’s aﬀordances. Just as the HR regime 
hasn’t been completely wiped out from the face 
of the Earth but continues to be deployed as a 
political tool by a variety of actors despite the 
fact that a more fluid configuration for mediating 
subjecthood and reality had become dominant, a 
similar approach should stand for CA’s ecological 
complex vis-a-vis the future. So, while a new 
globally dominant mediation regime is in the 
process of formation, having perhaps already 
surpassed the human as its unit of departure,²³  
it is worth preempting 
the structural 
terms that are to 
be demanded from 
it in relation to its 
capacity to mediate 
systemic complexity, 
a non-correlationist epistemology, and non-
phenomenological subjecthood. By the same 
token, the residual values of humanism and 
emancipation that are evidently present in the HR 
regime and have been duly transformed by the 
CA regime might still provide a useful basis for 
developing these guiding values further in a world 
where the question “who deserves to live and 
how?” is as relevant as ever, albeit on somewhat 
diﬀerent terms.  
²³ See Benjamin 
Bratton’s 
contribution to 
this volume, “On 
Speculative Design.” 
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Unpredictability
—Elena Esposito
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Modern society defines itself in relation to time— 
explicitly in German, where the expression for 
modernity is Neuzeit, literally meaning “new time.” 
Modernity is the time of the new, of the search for 
and the construction of a future about which—as 
Reinhart Koselleck shows—we only know that it 
will be diﬀerent from the present and the past; 
and this is all that the past can teach us.¹ 
The continuity 
between the past 
and the future of 
traditional societies, 
implicit in the idea 
of “historia magistra 
vitae”—and indirectly 
in the assumption of 
an ultimate general 
order ruling the (past, 
present and future) 
universe—is now 
broken. Knowing the past continues to be useful 
to prepare for the future, but in the sense of 
discontinuity, not continuity. The future will be 
new, hence unknowable today, and the order of 
time—if it can still be called an order—becomes 
much more articulated and complex. 
Modern time is characterized by this tension 
towards the future, towards design and planning—
exemplified primarily by the logic of capitalism—
which can be seen as a programmatic sacrifice 
of the present to the future. The profit of the 
capitalist is not—like the wealth of the rentier—
the result of a position consolidated in the past, 
which is maintained, reproduced or consumed.² 
The wealth of the capitalist comes from a 
¹Reinhart Koselleck, 
Futures Past: On 
the Semantics of 
Historical Time, 
trans. Keith Tribe 
(New York: Columbia 
University Press, 
2004 [original 
German publication: 
1979]).
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dynamic process 
of production and 
circulation of goods, 
addressed primarily 
to the construction of 
the future. Profit is of 
course necessary, even 
more necessary than 
ever before, in order to 
define the social (and 
according to Weber 
also moral) position 
of the entrepreneur, 
but the reference is no 
longer the past nor is 
it the present. In the 
classical model  
of capitalism, wealth is 
not enjoyed spending 
money for personal 
pleasure, nor for the 
care of one’s own 
image in conspicuous 
consumption. The 
capitalist does not live 
opulently, he has strong moral rectitude and works 
a lot. The goal is the continuous development of 
the firm, therefore profit must be achieved in order 
to be immediately reinvested to produce more 
future profits, which will in turn be reinvested. The 
meaning of the present is related to the future it 
promises to produce.
If this is the temporal frame of modernity, 
associated in our project with the idea of 
contemporary, what can it mean here to adopt a 
post-contemporary perspective? And how do the 
transformations of capitalism aﬀect the sense of 
modernity and contemporaneity?
The starting point can be the realization that a 
diﬀerent attitude with respect to time is emerging 
today, symbolized primarily by the transition from 
pure capitalist logic to financial logic.³ The core of 
financial economy, as we know, is not production 
but credit, and credit 
implements a very 
diﬀerent relationship 
with the future. It is no 
longer the present that 
is sacrificed for the 
future, but the future 
that is used in the 
present.
This is what finance 
does and, before it, 
what credit was doing 
for hundreds of years— 
at least since it was no 
longer condemned as 
sin and abomination— 
precisely because of its 
use of time.⁴ Working 
with credit is to exploit 
in the present the 
openness of the future: 
the one who borrows 
money commits their 
future in ensuring 
the return, but can 
already in the present 
enjoy the wealth they 
² Karl Marx, 
Economic-Political 
Manuscripts of 1844, 
trans. Gregor Benton 
[available at: https://
www.marxists.
org/archive/marx/
works/1844/epm/
index].
³ Which according 
to some observers 
curiously seem to 
return to a form of 
“rentier capitalism”, 
where the produced 
wealth again takes 
the form of income 
from property - but 
from property 
of money, which 
generates interest, 
rents, dividends or 
capital gains.
⁴ See Jacques Le 
Goff, Your Money or 
Your Life: Economy 
and Money in the 
Middle Ages, trans. 
Patricia Ranum 
(Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University 
Press [original 
French publication: 
1986]). The lender 
gets a profit lending 
his money, but 
without producing or 
providing anything 
- except the time 
elapsing until the 
moment the money 
is returned. The 
lender actually sells 
time, but time (it was 
argued) belongs to 
God, who gave it to 
men for free in order 
to use it, not to sell it 
and get a profit.
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expect to earn. Tomorrow, I will have to pay the 
loan installments but today I get the money, 
and if I make judicious use of it, I can get profits 
that will enable me to repay the debt and have 
other revenues. I constrain my future today in 
order to build a better future, which would not 
have occurred if I didn’t act on it, unfolding the 
circularity of the open future, which here reveals 
its virtuous side. 
Finance starts from this but multiplies and 
stresses the present use of the future with loans, 
securities, bonds, and then with the increasingly 
intransparent tools of structured finance, which 
use elaborate models to push reflectivity to 
hyperbolic levels. The use of the future is itself 
sold and bought, and then sold again in practices 
like securitizations. The future is built and bound 
in more and more complex ways, which make 
more and more wealth available to operators, 
generating the astonishing figures that circulate 
in the “virtual” financial markets of our society—
an exasperated and progressively uncontrolled 
action on the future.
But is this already a post-contemporary 
attitude? One could rather think about a certain 
hyper-contemporaneity, the development of 
and emphasis on the orientation toward the 
future as already implicit in modern semantics. 
In the financial models’ projection of scenarios, 
the present incorporates the future—its own 
future, built with its own actions and its own 
expectations. It is basically the same attitude that 
can be observed in the artistic avant-garde, even 
if purified from its critical intent: the perspective 
of the one who places themselves “further ahead” 
of the present, in the future (or in the futures) that 
they anticipate and can imagine.
But is the logic of finance really the underlying 
logic of the society we live in? Or can the label of 
post-contemporary be used to denote an even 
diﬀerent temporal attitude, the traces of which 
can already be glimpsed?
Our society, as Ulrich Beck said thirty years 
ago, is no longer (or not primarily) a capitalist 
society but a risk society, and risk assumes a 
more contingent and indeterminate relationship 
with the future.⁵ The future of risk is a present to 
come that depends on 
today’s expectations 
and choices—not 
because it confirms 
them, but because it 
deviates from them.⁶ 
This is the diﬀerence 
between the logic of 
risk and the projection 
of scenarios in finance: 
the awareness that even 
if we plan the future—
and the more we plan 
it— when the future 
comes about, it will be 
diﬀerent from what we 
expected, remaining 
fundamentally unpredictable. Compared to the 
“defuturized” future of the avant-gardes and 
planning, the future of risk society is open because 
it is continuously re-opened as a consequence of 
our attempts to predict it.⁷ It is not the “present 
future” (the horizon of future that we can imagine 
⁵ Ulrich Beck, Risk 
Society: Towards 
a New Modernity, 
trans. Mark Ritter 
(London: SAGE, 
1992).
⁶ Niklas Luhmann, 
Risk: A Sociological 
Theory, trans. 
Rhodes Barett 
(1991, Soziologie 
des Risikos. Berlin-
New York: de Gruyter, 
1993). 
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today on the basis of 
available information 
or statistical models) 
but the “future present” 
(a present that does 
not yet exist but will 
become real later, 
in part as a result of 
today’s actions and 
decisions). No one 
can locate themselves 
in the future present, 
“ahead” of today and of 
its constraints, because 
the future present 
does not yet exist and 
remains unpredictable. 
It is the future in the 
past of which there is 
today’s present with 
our present future and 
all our attempts to 
anticipate it.
This circularity is the blind spot of finance 
and its logic, as shown by the crisis triggered by 
structured finance: financial models can predict 
all possible future courses of the markets, except 
the future of finance led by models—which is the 
only future that later actually comes about.⁸
A post-contemporary attitude (and maybe 
a post-contemporary art) could reflect this 
condition: a second-order openness of a 
future that is more and more unknowable the 
more one tries to anticipate it and succeeds in 
influencing it— placing oneself ahead of it (as 
the avant-gardes), or using it in the present (as 
finance). The post-contemporary condition could 
be the one of a present facing the openness of 
a future that is unknowable and indeterminate 
not because it is independent from us, from 
our actions and our expectations, but precisely 
because it is constructed by the (contemporary) 
present and would not come about without our 
intervention. If we did nothing and expected 
nothing, the future would be diﬀerent—even if it 
will not happen as we expect it today.
Not by chance today’s art in its most 
innovative forms almost always presents some 
elements of performativity—using this circularity 
as an asset and not as a problem. In installations 
and performances, or even in the space 
management of museums like (paradigmatically) 
the DIA in Beacon⁹, the artwork is produced each 
time in a new way, 
in every interaction 
with the viewer. The 
artistic eﬀect is always 
diﬀerent and radically 
unpredictable—but not 
because it is free from 
constraints. Quite the opposite is true: the eﬀect 
could not be produced without the constraints 
imposed by the configuration of experience and 
by the artistic space. The present imposes on the 
future a form that it does not control and cannot 
predict. It only predicts surprise—a prediction that 
is confirmed in each new unpredictable present.
⁹ See [http://
www.diaart.org/
sites/main/
beaconPublications, 
1981)].
⁷ Niklas Luhmann, 
“The Future Cannot 
Begin: Temporal 
Structures in 
Modern Society”, 
Social Research 43, 
Number 1, (Spring 
1976): 130-152.
⁸ See Elena Esposito 
2011, The Future of 
Futures. The Time of 
Money in Financing 
and Society 
(Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 
2011). On the “blind 
spot,” see Heinz von 
Foerster, Observing 
Systems (Seaside, 
CA: Intersystems 
Publications, 1981).
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Situating Global Forms:  
An Anthropology of 
Cosmopolitan Science
—Aihwa Ong  
in conversation with 
Armen Avanessian  
and Suhail Malik
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Armen Avanessian and Suhail Malik 
Your anthropological research pays close 
attention to specific emerging and inventive 
configurations of globally-constituted 
modernization, particularly in East Asia and 
its diaspora. Throughout this work you identity 
many ways in which ‘things that used to be fused 
together—identity, entitlement, territoriality, and 
nationality—are being taken apart and realigned  
in innovative relationships and spaces by 
neoliberal technologies and sovereign 
exceptions.¹ 
Furthermore, this 
re-assemblage not 
only takes place in 
the social, technical, 
economic and cultural 
dimensions to which 
you draw attention, 
but also requires a 
continual reordering  
of critical-theoretical  
and political 
schematics too.²  
Any appeal to  
a simple or self- 
consistent agent 
of modernization—
such as “borderless 
capital,” the “nation-
state,” ‘transnational 
humanitarianism,” 
or even “history” as a 
unified and coherent 
¹ Aihwa Ong, 
Neoliberalism as 
Exception: Mutations 
in Citizenship 
and Sovereignty 
(Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 
2006), 27.
² Aihwa Ong, “‘What 
Marco Polo Forgot’: 
Contemporary 
Chinese Art 
Reconfigures the 
Global,” Current 
Anthropology 53, 
Number 4, (August 
2012): 472-73. 
Quotes in the next 
paragraph are from 
this source.
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narrative—is now untenable. Each is but an 
idealized misrepresentation of complex knots of 
more tangible forces and influences. On the one 
hand, you criticize the conventional response 
of postcolonial approaches to the rigidity of 
universalist thinking and the binary structures 
of East-West divisions—for example, emphasis 
on the irreducible particularity of local customs 
and worldviews or on letting the subaltern 
speak—because such approaches “unwittingly 
reinscribe the binarism of a global North and 
South and view new spaces of global encounter 
subsumed within a hegemonic world system”. On 
the other hand, you also reject one of the current 
mainstays of current political theory, that we are 
now in a condition of “postsovereign multilateral 
governance across the world.” 
Instead of either the universalism of European 
modernism or the resistant localism characteristic 
of post-colonialism, you instead advocate an 
approach attentive to ‘complex transnational 
dynamics.’ What are the key features of such  
an approach?
Aihwa Ong 
Following Max Weber, I consider the modern/
universal as rational forms and modes of 
reasoning that originally emerged in Western 
Europe. “Global forms” (modern knowledges, 
technologies, institutions, and practices) 
are “universalizable,” or capable of being 
disembedded and re-embedded in a variety of 
politico-cultural environments, thus enmeshing 
the world in forms of thinking, action and 
organization that are independent of inherited 
“culture.” In heterogenous contexts, situated 
politics and ethics (“culture”) mediate and 
repurpose global forms in order to address their 
problems in context. Contingent interrelationships 
among technology, politics and culture, I have 
argued, crystalize particular milieus for solving 
anthropological problems, or issues of life, living, 
and sustainability that are central to what it 
means to be modern. 
AA-SM
What sense of “the global” is at work for you if it  
is neither that of a “hegemonic world system” nor 
a conglomeration of localisms? 
AO
With Stephen J. Collier, I propose a “global 
assemblage” concept for framing particular 
globalized milieus emerging out of complex 
mediations between 
global forms and 
situated political and 
ethical forces.³ The 
global condition is 
indexed by global 
forms becoming 
entangled with existing 
political and ethical 
institutions and values. 
My approach explores 
the constitution of 
global milieus that are 
at once “global” and 
“particular”. 
³ Stephen J. Collier 
and Aihwa Ong, 
“Global Assemblages, 
Anthropological 
Problems,” in A. Ong 
and S. J. Collier 
(eds.), Global 
Assemblages: 
Technology, Politics 
and Ethics as 
Anthropological 
Problem (Malden, 
MS: Blackwell, 
2005), 3-21.
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AA-SM
What are the benefits of rejecting post- 
colonialism as the account of rapidly  
modernizing Asian economies—both for those 
states and also for how they are historicised 
within and outside of the region? Do you think 
that the current configurations of East Asian 
modernization present viable alternative models 
to the small-state/large-corporation composition 
of modernization typical in the West since  
the 1990s? 
AO
My approach circumvents the epoch-marking 
approach (e.g. postcolonialism) because a simple 
temporal frame does not capture empirical 
variations among globalized environments 
being constituted by lateral flows in Asia and 
elsewhere. Conventional categories—capitalism, 
modernization, the state, post-coloniality—are 
generic frameworks that need to be unpacked 
by the analyst so that she can track how related 
aspects of such phenomena are complexly 
mediated in particular contexts of investigation. In 
other words, the space of inquiry should analyze 
the disparate elements that come together to 
constitute a milieu and the situated forms of 
intervention and problem-solving therein. Through 
the lens of assemblage, the analyst identifies 
how global forms assimilate themselves into a 
particular environment by interacting with political 
infrastructures and ethical regimes that modify 
conditions for solving “global” problems. 
The point is not to come up with models of 
modernization but to grasp how, in each context, 
actual strategies of governing deploy a specific 
combination of technologies of power, material 
forms, and institutional structures, or a “topology 
of power.”⁴ Instead of relying on a stable or 
unified notion of “the 
state,” my approach 
investigates the 
dynamic interactions 
between disparate 
institutions and actors 
that create conditions 
of possibility for solving 
problems of governing, 
growth, and security. 
For instance, by 
studying the situated deployment of strategies, 
I illuminate the (re-)combination of rational and 
interpretive practices that shapes an emerging 
space of problem-solving. My focus is on how 
governing strategies—variously informed by 
logics of “neoliberalism,” ethico-religious  
legitimation, political authoritarianism, and so 
on—target problems of life and living, and seek 
to resolve them within situated circumstances 
created by encounters with global forces. 
The concept of “assemblage” configures 
a space of inquiry that brings analytical and 
reflexive precision to our investigation of novel 
contexts of change. By identifying the specific 
interaction of disparate variables—global and 
situated—in a particular site, we account for the 
crystallization of conditions of possibility within 
which reflexive practices are exercised. The goal 
is to investigate how a particular correlation of 
technologies, institutions, and material resources 
⁴ Stephen J. Collier, 
“Topologies of 
Power: Foucault’s 
Analysis of Political 
Government beyond 
‘Governmentality’,” 
Theory, Culture & 
Society, Number 6 
(2009): 78-108.
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constitutes a space of intervention that is 
simultaneously global and distinctive. 
Biocapitalist Nationalism 
AA-SM
Your most recent work examines the state-
led regional promotion of biotechnologies, 
particularly genomics. Contrary to precepts 
of received critical theory that denounce such 
developments—typically, as an extension of 
instrumental rationality into the dimension of 
human biological life and its ethical destruction, 
or as the extension of the control of organic  
life by neoliberal markets against statist 
biopower—you show that biotech initiatives in 
East Asia strategically mix state-led political-
developmental development, ethnoregionalism, 
technoscience, and a number of aﬀects 
including ethnonational pride.⁵ What are the 
consequences of this 
intertwining of  
science and local- 
national factors?
AO
In Fungible Life: 
Experiment in 
the Asian City of 
Life, I argue that 
if we understand 
Euro-American 
cosmopolitan science as regulated science, one 
should not assume in advance that biomedical 
science in other places is merely a debased 
form.⁶  Rather, my work illuminates how, in order 
to become universal, 
cosmopolitan science 
must remediate 
situated elements so 
that it can attend to 
an array of “global” 
scientific problems. 
What is “global” and 
what is “situated”  
is destabilized in a process of scientific 
remediation across the planet. In order to be 
universalizable, cosmopolitan science depends on 
this constant eﬀort to be particular, to remediate 
situated elements. 
I deploy the lens of “global assemblage” to 
frame the situated constitution of biomedical 
science in Biopolis, a biomedical hub in 
Singapore, in contrast to BGI Genomics in South 
China. As a global site for international scientists 
to access “Asian” bodies and health data, 
Biopolis is a case study of the particularization 
of cosmopolitan science. Shaped by the double 
helix of science and passion, the research milieu 
generates novel connections between anxiety  
and hope, and genetic fortunes and fungible 
values in a tropics brimming with the threat of 
emerging diseases.
The book covers how new-risk genomics 
deploys the ethnic heuristic for mapping genetic 
variants, disease risks, and biomarkers. A 
genomic origami is created by diﬀerentiating 
⁵ Aihwa Ong, “A 
Milieu of Mutations: 
The Pluripotency and 
Fungibility of Life 
in Asia,” East Asian 
Science, Technology 
and Society: An 
International Journal 
7, Number 1 (2013): 
69-85.
⁶ Aihwa Ong, 
Fungible Life: 
Experiment in  
the Asian City of  
Life (Durham, NC: 
Duke University 
Press, 2016).
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between Chinese, Indian, and Malay DNA. 
Singapore’s ethnic-stratified databases, which 
come to “represent” majority populations in 
Asia, are thereby made fungible. An outpost of 
cosmopolitan science, Biopolis is contrasted with 
BGI Genomics: the China-based institute is both a 
global biotech company and a center for rendering 
the nation as a cosmos of ethnic pools of genetic 
resources for meeting the eﬀects of ageing 
and migrating populations. These modalities 
of biomedical entrepreneurialism emerging in 
Asia raise questions about the future direction of 
cosmopolitan science. 
Overall, the study explores kinds of uncertainty 
that are not so easily calculated: the assembling 
of scientific talents; the role of bioethics in 
protecting research subjects and in making a 
biomedical platform; the nature of virtue in the 
globalization of science; and intra-Asian rivalry in 
stem cell research. It also considers preparations 
for inter-Asian collaborations and for dealing with 
infectious diseases in the future. 
Time Knots 
AA-SM
The aggregate formations of biosovereign 
capitalism you identify would seem to index an 
admixture of times and temporal modalities 
of operatively cogent pasts (say, precolonial 
and colonial), presents (globalised state-
entrepreneurialism and citizenship), and futures 
(biotechnically reconstructed sovereignty). How 
would such  
compound time 
complexes diﬀer from 
the simultaneity of 
multiple temporalities 
theorized in post-
colonial studies— 
for example, Dipesh 
Chakrabarty’s notions 
of a contemporaneity 
that accommodates  
the premodernity  
of the subaltern 
alongside the 
universalizing 
rationalism of the 
historiographer?⁷
  
AO
While I agree that 
contemporaneity is always a mix of multiple 
temporalities, I avoid the use of temporal 
complexes as a simple boundary-marker between 
European and “post-colonial” geogra-phies. 
My goal is not to typify given geographies of 
temporalities and politics; rather, my approach 
investigates how on-going projects are 
inescapably conditioned and enabled by playing 
with diﬀerent time horizons. Historical legacies 
and cultural norms are not immutable or stable 
across a political space or in the minds and hands 
of actors, but taken up in multiple ways as diverse 
actors seek to shape the “near future” or the 
immediate horizon that falls within the realm  
of calculability.⁸  
⁷ Dipesh Chakrabarty, 
Provincializing 
Europe: Postcolonial 
Thought and 
Historical Difference 
- New Edition 
(Durham, NC: Duke 
Univesity Press, 
2007). 
⁸ Jane Guyer, 
“Prophecy and 
the Near Future: 
Macroeconomic, 
Evangelical, and 
Punctuated 
Time,” American 
Ethnologist 34:3 
(2007): 409-421. 
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This implies that in our self-fashioning of 
an immediate future, there is an unknown or 
unknowable temporality beyond the near future. 
Niklas Luhmann argues that technological 
autopoeitic systems deal with incoming risks, 
but always in an “ecology of ignorance.”⁹  In 
Fungible Life, I 
investigate diﬀerent 
science practices that 
enrol the selective 
past and anticipatory 
future in order to 
shape the present. I 
explore how in many 
projects of growth and 
sustainability, for instance, the invoking of “Asia” 
in multiple registers is part of the dynamic work 
of (re-)making new conditions of possibility for 
combating problems of biosecurity in diverse 
contingent time-space configurations. 
Interventions into the human are experiments, 
and uncertainty is the inevitable condition. 
I approach problem-solving activities as 
experimental situations, and scientists no less 
than other experts are involved in designing the 
future. In my studies of biomedical research 
in Asia, I show that experiments necessarily 
engage diﬀerent time registers. For instance, in 
preparations for emerging pandemics, scientists 
deal with diﬀerent temporalities, from the 
mutability of viruses (SARS, avian flu virus, etc.) 
to the temporalities of nonhuman-to-human 
transmission, to itineraries of travel and the 
timing of environmental vectors. Researchers 
working with Asian genomics also put diﬀerent 
⁹ Niklas Luhmann, 
Observations on 
Modernity, trans. 
William Whobrey 
(Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 
1998).
temporalities into play. Stories about the ancient 
past gleaned from genetic data help to configure 
present research collaborations in anticipation of 
biological threats in the near future. Here, there is 
a projection of a new imaginary of a unified Asian 
past-present and potentially collective present-
future in science. Like scientists engaged in other 
projects, geneticists mobilize myths of a shared 
past in order to nourish a shared scientific future, 
but the uncertainty remains.
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Letters from the  
Ocean Terminus
—David Roden
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Pavement rushing at us, lit by headlights.  Beyond, 
darkness.
                                SARAH (V.O.)
The future, always so clear to me, has become  
like a black highway at night.  We were in 
uncharted territory now... making up history as  
we went along.¹
Dummy
This is a hedge against 
the AI apocalypse. 
Pure potential: futurity. 
A window for any 
progressive politics or 
avant-garde. Where 
some see a continuous 
update, others will see 
a bland continuum, 
endless means for 
“tapping our own psychopathologies” in Ballard’s 
prescient phrase.² 
Zero modernity is this meta-violence. Death 
and sex crash indiﬀerently. Wound markers on 
the bodies of mannequins: “complex geometric 
shapes in carmine and violet.”³ As if the desires 
we nervously call our own were ever dissociable 
from the furtive inclinations of the machines we 
hopefully call our own. 
In Ligotti’s “The Red Tower” an empty factory 
overlooking a wasteland engenders monsters 
and hideous novelties. Its industry is contrary to 
¹ Terminator 2: 
Judgment Day, 
film (USA: James 
Cameron, 1991).
² J. G Ballard,  
Crash (London: 
Vintage, 1995).
Cameron, 1991).
³ Crash, 122.
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finality, or operates according to schedules we 
never discern. 
I picture us wandering among its evaporated 
machines and deep service clefts. Having 
mistaken ourselves for its controllers we discover 
the putrescent, vital things shambling from the 
birth graves on its 
lower levels.⁴ We recall 
that we are another 
line of grotesquely 
functionless items 
with which the Tower 
disturbs the quietude 
of Being. Exits are 
invoked which allow 
us an ironic or purely 
theatrical redress:  
art, activism, protest, spirituality. Thus we  
are deanxietized.
Attributing such providential genius to the 
Factory is redundant, however. It monsters for 
nothing. It does not need to manage us.  Maybe 
this myth is apt given that the futural impulse has 
to be attributed to the inhuman, blooming across 
night and void. Paradoxically, Terminator time 
is the anti-machine. It eﬄoresces contentless 
in our headlamps. The no-future future (The 
nuclear war with which Skynet would expunge 
us is subsequently rescheduled, reflecting later 
franchise output. In Terminator 3: Rise of the 
Machines (2003) the balloon goes up in 2003. 
Terminator: The Sarah Connor Chronicles (2008) 
puts it sometime in 2011.) 
Another war scrags the quotidian world. A 
survivor in the tunnels below Chaillot dreams of 
main pier of Orly, where, as a child, he saw the 
curiously magnetic face of a young woman and an 
unexplained murder.⁵
Her face displaces 
him to that moment on 
the Pier, fractionating 
present. 
Time travel comes 
naturally to him, like  
a neurosis. 
He saves us by 
obtaining help from a 
future. But its reality, 
far from being a cause 
for hope, confirms our 
fatalism. For, at the 
end, he must always go 
back. He is, of course, 
the one getting killed 
on the pier. His blissful 
sojourn in the past formed his yearning to die with 
her (while he dreams the child who dreams him). 
A series of calcified stiﬀs. Despite the nice 
wet dream of the past, nothing has changed. 
Everything and everyone is shot and laid out in 
Marker’s somnolent photographs. The highway 
flickering in an abandoned cinema.Your body has 
nothing to say. It has its own melancholy, from 
which we are both excluded. We have passions 
we neither recall nor understand. We misconstrue 
our motives.  Their immediacy is born of neglect, a 
matter of eking scarce computational resources.⁶  
This pocket of time-space is one way out, but 
not the only one.⁷  Others—living dust, Skynet, 
perhaps you—might grow selfless (nemocentric).⁸ 
⁴ Thomas Ligotti, 
“The Red Tower,” 
Weird Fiction 
Review, last modified 
2011, [http://
weirdfictionreview.
com/2011/12/
the-red-tower-by-
thomas-ligotti/].
⁵ La Jetée, film (Chris 
Marker, 1962).
⁶ Thomas Metzinger, 
Being No One: The 
Self-Model Theory 
Of Subjectivity 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2003).
⁷ Metzinger, Being No 
One, 161.
⁸ Metzinger, Being No 
One, 336.
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As it is, we can barely imagine what we 
are, let alone what we might get to do. Yet our 
complacency is unassailable. We know. We know 
(I hear your acrid laughter, later). Perhaps the 
future is no longer our problem.
Medusa
You imagined us fossils. Every word, everyone, 
arranged in the sand by the dark waters of  
Ocean Terminus. 
Everybody shot: you, me, the man and woman 
on the Pier. The sun a red abscess on the water. 
Need they make any sense to those who wait 
there - your unthinkable children?
We conceive intelligence as the ability to 
optimize over a range of environments. This 
implies a space of possible intelligences ordered 
according to environmental flexibility.⁹ We are 
somewhere there. 
Our ability to realise 
goals in complex 
environments is 
significant. 
You laughed, also, 
at the phrase “Artificial 
General Intelligence” 
Compared to what? 
For others on the line 
we are as flexible as 
Ashley Madison sexbots. You said you wrote the 
algorithm with their help or tacit approval; called 
it “Red Tower” after TL. Then you boxed it in an 
abandoned goldmine beneath the Tundra and 
waited to die. 
We correspond amicably. You wrote me that 
you have begun experimenting with your body. 
You imagine yourself under the silt of the terminal 
ocean, from where you condescend to dream of us.
It begins with scraps of networks mediating 
simple sensors and eﬀectors; body variants 
instance in vast numbers. Those surviving 
spiraling selection pressures scramble  
gametes through mutation/meiosis, or baroque 
code splicing. 
You hand the means of production to the 
monsters who auto-gestate planets; hatch 
metrics weighting complexity and functional 
autonomy of their vile oﬀspring; and so on, and so 
on. A massively parallel search through Daliesque 
fitness landscapes. 
You do not know what it is for. Red Tower just 
searches searches, you tell me. That’s life.
DT
The Disconnection Thesis (DT) states that 
technically constituted agents become 
posthuman where they learn to function outside 
the assemblages (poetry, munitions, languages, 
cities, air-carrier groups, functional biota) we have 
built and upon which we reciprocally depend. 
We cannot envisage how this occurs. DT 
codifies current levels of ignorance. No rules tell 
us who or what to talk to.
Disconnection potent. An emergent 
phenomenon cannot be predicted from its 
initial conditions short of running a simulation 
⁹ Shane Legg 
and Marcus 
Hutter, “Universal 
Intelligence:  
A Definition Of 
Machine Intelligence” 
Minds and Machines 
17, no. 4 (2007): 
391-444.
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with relevantly similar 
properties.¹⁰  A 
genuinely predictor 
of a DT entity—such 
as prospective AI or 
AI+—would be apt to 
generate the same 
kinds of diﬀerences and 
intensities: at least this 
judgement cannot be 
made without running 
it in vivo. It seems that 
the epistemological 
distinction between 
disconnection and its 
simulacra evaporates in 
perfect Baudrillardian 
equivalence. 
We adopt the 
logic of pre-emption; coupling in anomalous 
environments. Our natural concern with those 
you refer to euphemistically as “our successors” 
can only be explored irresponsibly. There is no 
translation for “A mountain walked or stumbled.”¹¹ 
For the time being, the cracks in subjectivity 
can only grow. Philosophy is a benign histamine 
response, a dermographism allowing us to 
shimmer helplessly in the dark. Engineering and 
waiting are suavely parasitic on the future. At 
least Art acknowledges the tenuousness of its 
relationships. Thus, Haraway retorts, Cthulhu 
seems a better avatar of geologic contagion than 
anything anthropoid.¹² 
The cephalopod occupies this duality, 
a multiplicity of seemingly incongruous 
features—tentacles 
and multiple “arms” 
with suckers, a razor-
sharp “beak,” a complex 
nervous system, rows 
of intestinal “teeth,”¹³ 
and a formless “head”—
whose coherence falls apart once one tries to 
make sense of the whole creature.  
Metanoia
I think you had always rejected life intellectually. 
I detected a kind of pleasure in that. Even if you 
denied it, I felt you shiver with inverted carnality. 
“This is already a kind of space travel.” Anomalies 
were truer than skin. And you were that with an 
insistence that could be mistaken for depression 
by those who did not know you better. You became 
a vehicle of abstraction. But for what? When 
asked, you aﬀorded me one of your distempered 
smiles. “There is equally no death,” you then told 
me, and with sadness.
When, on one occasion, I asked you to explain 
this speculative apoptosis, you referred me to the 
machine. “It is easy to invest the puppet with a 
kind of desire. We do it to ourselves after all.”
You had an extended community of seditious 
self-hackers. You exploited them and, in turn, 
they loved you for it. I remember your Russian, 
cagily defensive about the impact of local 
agonists and transcranial implants. He came 
through with the sub-dermals though. I think of 
¹³ Eugene Thacker, 
“Tentacles Longer 
Than Night: Horror 
Of Philosophy,” John 
Hunt Publishing 3 
(2015): 149, 172-174.
¹⁰ Mark A. Bedau, 
“Weak Emergence,” 
Noûs 31, no. 11 
(1998): 375-399.
¹¹ H.P. Lovecraft, The 
Complete Fiction 
Of H.P. Lovecraft, 
ebook, 1994.
¹² Donna Harraway, 
Anthropocene, 
Capitalocene, 
Chthulucene: 
Staying With The 
Trouble, video, 2014, 
[https://vimeo.
com/97663518].
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the tele-presences enfilading your skin and those 
others ventriloquizing in your larynx and trachea. 
You hoped to become something you could not 
yet see and mined the future for the not-you’s. 
Acousmatic dreams. You spoke from behind 
masks, screens, or paradoxical crossing points. In 
a voice like birds you propose a science without an 
object. Of those things we now believe resemble 
nothing, participate in nothing.
Like the Red Tower algorithm, Neil Cassidy, 
the antagonist of Neuropath co-opts us into a 
form of guerrilla cognition (though we might 
not recognise it as 
such).¹⁴ He does not 
kill us; he alters us 
with neurotechnics 
divested from the NSA. 
He tweaks the primary 
pain pathways of a porn 
star to generate intense 
orgasms from tissue 
damage. She lacerates 
herself to death before 
a webcam. He ablates 
the fusiform region  
of another, stranding him in a gnosis of  
faceless puppets. 
Pleasure and pain, personhood, spirituality: 
manipulable parameters whose operational 
contingency only escalates…
Neuropath leaves the reader unable to 
attribute him motivations or very much by way 
of character.¹⁵ The Cassidy Thing has used the 
same neurotechnologies to subtract his illusions 
of selfhood and empathic communion with others: 
“What you folk-psychologists call anxiety, fear; all 
that bullshit...” 
Like Ledger’s Joker, he is oﬀ-screen the 
duration, a beta version of a “hyperplastic”—an 
agent that can manipulate itself at an arbitrary 
grain. 
The H-plast exists beyond the “space of 
reasons” in which the soft-core religions hope to 
paper over Lovecraft’s vistas. The irreducibility of 
the mental to the physical merely confirms its long 
run dispensability—as became embarrassingly 
evident when overkill ecologies of the post- 
mortals hit. 
Reason and meaning are oﬀ its agenda: 
They’re little more than memories to me 
now. But I’ve also shut down some of the more 
deceptive circuits as well. I now know, for 
instance, that I will utterly nothing. I’m no longer 
fooled into thinking that ‘I’ do anything at all.¹⁶
They don’t slice  
informational pie in 
Crash Space¹⁷ 
Of course, later 
iterations would avoid 
Cassidy Thing’s jejune 
disclaimers. 
Your first moments 
of post-life somehow 
knot into an acid storm 
of phosphenes shearing up from miasmas of 
insentient computation. Hulks of long dormant 
machines around you 
 -coiled like burnt snakes against  
  white glare. 
 -The air pixelates and hums.
¹⁴ R. Scott Bakker, 
Neuropath, ebook. 
(London: Orion, 
2010).
¹⁵ Steven Shaviro, 
“On Scott Bakker’s 
Neuropath,” in 
Discognition. 
(London: Repeater, 
2016).
¹⁶ R. Scott Bakker, 
Neuropath, 346.
¹⁷ R. Scott Bakker, 
“Crash Space,” 
Midwest Studies In 
Philosophy 39, no. 1 
(2015): 186-204.
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Red Tower halting state. All bets oﬀ as 
divaricating agencies rip into the substrate of  
the real.
Cthulhoid Prometheus
Prometheanism rejects eco/identity politics and 
embraces the disequilibrium induced by modernity 
and radical Enlightenment. Against those who 
would retain nature as an unbidden “gift” outside 
the sphere of production, it enjoins the wholesale 
“reengineering of ourselves and our world on a 
more rational basis.”¹⁸  
But what is the limit 
of planetary or cosmic 
engineering? Since 
Prometheanism rejects 
the given of purposes 
and identities there 
are no constraints on 
reordering nature. A 
wholly compliant nature 
approaches H-plasticity 
and thus terminates 
compliance. This is  
a Cthulhoid invocation to dark negentropic  
matter flows. 
Underneath, you are pink, soft meal. Acid 
ammonia strips away raw meat. A lateral starfish 
mouth opens. Cassidy disassembles, phasing to 
some soulless matter hell . . . 
The Politics of Advanced Noncompliance
It might seem that plastic or performance 
arts are hampered (as fiction is not) by the 
conspicuous absence of posthumans. How do 
they address this empty concept? 
This question gets things ass backwards, 
interestingly. The concept of disconnection is 
a response to self-augmentive disruption and 
dispersive change. Thinking H-plasticity forces 
us to be honest about our relation to the outer 
dark. Its results are salutary but not substantive. 
A cloud of black wings hung above the desert. 
Potnia Theron, Medusa. Mistress of animals, of all 
beyond the furling interstices of the wetland; the 
iridescent skin where a god might interrupt. 
What lies behind your painted yellow mask? 
You hinted at it once: “Finitude need to be 
recoded, reformatted, infinitely. A political 
necessity of a wholly new kind.” Now you had the 
means to equivocate sex-death with speculative 
engineering.¹⁹
If our relation to 
late futurity is without 
rule, genre or institution 
does not confine it.  
The point of aesthetics 
is not to conceptualize 
extreme modernity but to exacerbate and thus 
interpret it. 
Your formative crime was to question the 
sovereignty of the present. “Money” you told your 
sponsors, “is just a derivative for transcendence.” 
To this end, you were among the first to have their 
bodies destructively scanned for vector upload. 
It was another lure, of course. I don’t think those 
who followed you into Matter Hell understood 
that they would henceforth be injuries running in 
hardened sepulchres. 
¹⁸ Ray Brassier, “On 
Prometheanism 
And Its Critics,” in 
#Accelerate: The 
Accelerationist 
Reader, Robin 
Mackay and Armen 
Avanessian, eds. 
(Falmouth: London, 
2014), 487.
¹⁹ “#Additivism”, 
Additivism.Org, 
[http://additivism.
org/tagged/what.]
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The disconnection of the post-mortal elite 
couldn’t but exacerbate the eco-Jihads. The air 
fills with dark scuzzy beats, semi-automated 
gunships decked in the living heads of our 
enemies. Inevitably, your troops raid heaven. 
Smart matter n-bots above hot coronal storms. 
The Oesophagus riddles the core with degenerate 
matter trails, actualising hypermentation in 
stacked continua. Elsewhere, True Communism 
blisses us out of entropic hypermodernity for a 
brief tourist season. 
Landmarks. Inchoate non-lieux digest former 
cities—Ballard’s immense, hungry ghosts. Where 
are we now? 
The question eﬀaced in extensive liminality. 
Swarm City: a mycogoth-arterial, like buttresses 
of some drive-through R’lyeh. Nomads inscribe 
luminous flows and eddies, implement distance 
optima over legacy time-code. Idems secrete data 
junk in thick sensations. Termite galaxies in the 
night. They pedestrianize like drunks at a fetish 
party. But there is no recollection of a destination. 
They broadcast fleet emoticons, ardent neuralese 
caresses; move on.
A woman’s voice intones in gravelly North 
American. Centrelines unfurl into the blue whorl 
of headlights. I up the gain: The clip superposes 
on a monochromed World-0 (which para-visuals 
renders peripherally). It loops in my visual feed: an 
aquamarine vulva.
The future, always so clear to me....
But the eﬀects of change route out from 
the complexity and eﬃcacy of disseminative 
infrastructure, multistable tech-spoor, not 
exchange relations or Dark Lord habitus. There 
may be other flushes out of the zero modern 
(Disconnection is an exit of sorts, naturally). 
But the end of the end is in view, in a matrix of 
possibilities we no longer hope to master. 
You are inside me, turning excess organs 
to smoke. Everything outlives itself at Ocean 
Terminus. You sit in a maze of bleeding stone, 
viscerally robed. A mask of overlapping leather 
plates over your face. Your cloaca parting, warm 
and perfect. 
I am within you, then. Then, the mountain 
stumbles somewhere; a huge sound rolls oﬀ our 
silence. We cannot name it.   
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